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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the construction of dynamic general equilibrium mod-
els useful for the analysis of policy questions. W ed ot h i sb yd e v e l o p i n g a standard monetary
business cycle model in three directions: We add several shocks, a banking sector and ﬁnancial
frictions. We subject this model to what is perhaps the toughest possible test. We ﬁtt h em o d e l
to U.S. data from the 1920s and 1930s and ask whether a different monetary policy might have
moderated the output collapse experienced in the Great Depression.1 Our analysis suggests that
t h ea n s w e ri s“ y e s . ”T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ehypothesis of Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
Apart from its intrinsic historical interest, there are two reasons we examine the U.S. economy
in the 1930s. First, there is a general consensus that the Great Depression was a consequence of
the interaction of several shocks with ﬁnancial markets, labor markets, and the banking system. As
a result, this episode constitutes a natural laboratory for studying a model like ours. Second, there
is widespread interest in understanding whether monetary policy authorities in a low-interest-rate
environment have the power to resist deﬂation and output collapse. This is the situation confronted
by the US monetary authorities in the 1930s.
The counterfactual monetary policy that we study temporarily expands the growth rate in the
monetarybaseinthewakeofamoneydemandshock. Toensurethatthispolicydoesnotviolatethe
zero lower-bound constraint on the interest rate, we consider policies which increase the monetary
base in the periods after a shock.2 By injecting an anticipated inﬂa t i o ne f f e c ti n t ot h ei n t e r e s t
rate, this delayed-response feature of our policy prevents the zero bound constraint from binding
along the equilibrium paths that we consider. Of course, for the anticipated inﬂa t i o ne f f e c tt ob e
operative, the public must believe that the central bank will in fact raise the future growth rate of
the monetary base. In our analysis, we assume the central bank has this credibility.3
1There are numerous other quantitative analyses of the Great Depression, with perhaps the ﬁrst being Lucas and
Rapping (1972). In addition, there is the work of Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz (1995), Bordo, Erceg, and Evans
(2000), Christiano (1999), Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2001, 2003, 2003a), McCallum (1990), and Sims (1999).
2An alternative strategy for stimulating the economy when the nominal rate of interest is near zero is to drive the
rate to its lower bound and hold it there for a while (see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for a discussion). Because
the policy involves an occasionally binding constraint, studying it requires confronting substantial computational chal-
lenges, which we have not pursued here. Computational strategies for imposing constraints that bind occasionally are
discussed in Christiano and Fisher (2000).
3Recently, several analysts have voiced skepticism that the sort of monetary policy we study has credibility. They
argue that central bankers - either as a result of a careful assessment of their incentives and constraints, or because of an
unreasonedpreference-mayhaveanunshakablecommitmenttolowinﬂationatalltimes. (See, forexample, Krugman
1998, Eggertsson 2003, Eggertsson and Woodford 2003, Sims 1999, and others.) There are two ways to interpret the
fact that we abstract from these concerns in our study. First, a convincing demonstration that temporarily high inﬂation
in the wake of certain types of shocks would have had desirable consequences during the Great Depression may help
promote the institutional or other changes necessary for such a policy to be credible in the future. Second, a case can
be made that the policy would in fact have been credible in the U.S. in the 1930s. Reinforced by the gold standard, the
price level had been stable throughout the previous decade. So, it might have seemed natural for the public to expect at
least some inﬂation after the initial price level drop in the early 1930s. Moreover, as the Great Depression proceeded,
a political constituency in favor of inﬂation began to take hold (Kennedy 1999.) Much of this constituency was in the
2In our model we focus on monetary policy alone, in isolation from ﬁscal policy. Implicitly,
we assume that the ﬁscal authorities accommodate any ﬁscal implications of monetary policy by a
suitable adjustment in taxes.4 We abstract from the distortionary effects of the latter, by assuming
the adjustments are done with lump sum taxes. The notion that the ﬁscal authorities passively (in
the sense of Leeper 1991) adjust the variables in their budget constraint to accommodate changes
in circumstances is consistent with accounts of the 1930s.5
Although our estimated model has eight shocks, two of them turn out to be particularly signif-
icant. The ﬁrst is a “liquidity preference shock”, which plays an important role in the contraction
phase of the Great Depression.6 This shock drives households to accumulate currency at the ex-
pense of demand deposits and other liabilities (time deposits) that are used to fund entrepreneurs
w h oo w na n do p e r a t et h ee c o nomy’s stock of capital.7 The impact on the real economy of these
responses to the liquidity preference shock is determined by the nature of intermediation in our
model.
Demand deposits are issued by banks, which use the proceeds to fund working-capital loans
to goods-producing ﬁrms. We capture this by adopting a version of the fractional reserve banking
model of Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995). Our model allows us to study the mechanism
whereby households’ shift away from demand deposits leads to a slowdown in economic activity.
Time deposits are issued by banks for the purpose of ﬁnancing entrepreneurs, who own and operate
the economy’s stock of capital. Entrepreneurs require bank ﬁnancing because their own net worth
is insufﬁcient to ﬁnance the purchase of the economy’s capital stock. We capture the ﬁnancial
arrangements associated with entrepreneursw i t hav e r s i o no ft h ea g e n c yc o s tm o d e lo fﬁnancial
frictions of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) (BGG).8
We now brieﬂy summarize the ways in which households’ shift away from time deposits leads
Democratic Party, which was the party of the president after Roosevelt was elected in the fall of 1932. On this basis,
we conjecture that a policy of temporary inﬂation, even one that somewhat exceeded what was implied by a price
level target, would not have been incredible in the U.S. in the 1930s. (However, as argued recently by Orphanides
2003, such a policy would have required some changes at the Federal Reserve, whose ofﬁcials had a low tolerance for
inﬂation.)
4That the operating characteristics of monetary policy depend sensitively on the assumptions one makes about
ﬁscal policy has been emphasized recently in the literature on the ﬁscal theory of the price level. See, for example,
Leeper and Sims (1994), Sims (1994), and Woodford (1994, 1996). (Christiano and Fitzgerald 2000 provide a critical
review).
5Concerns about ﬁscal solvency motivated Herbert Hoover to ask for the sizeable tax increase that became the
Revenue Act of 1932 (Kennedy 1999, p. 79). Roosevelt was also concerned about ﬁscal solvency. He pushed for one
bill to reduce government spending and another to raise taxes because “For three long years the Federal Government
has been on the road toward bankruptcy.” (Kennedy 1999, p. 138). These bills were the Economy Act of March 20,
1933 and the Beer-Wine act of March 22, 1933.
6For a related discussion, see Field (1984), who argues that a money demand shock played an important role during
this time.
7This is consistent with Sims (1999), who ﬁnds that disturbances that resulted in a ﬂow out of bank deposits and
into currency were important during the Great Depression.
8This work builds on Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Townsend (1979). Related models include those of Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997,2000).
3to a decline in economic activity. The ‘ﬁrst round’ effect of the shift is obvious: by reducing
the funding available to entrepreneurs, the shift leads to a fall in capital purchases and, hence,
investment. The ﬁnancial frictions induce additional effects which magnify this initial decline in
investment. These ‘accelerator effects’ occur as the initial decline in investment leads to a fall
in entrepreneurial net worth. This fall occurs through three channels. First, the initial decline
in entrepreneurial demand for cap i t a lp r o d u c e saf a l li ni t sp r i c e . T h i sr e d u c e st h en e tw o r t ho f
entrepreneurs by reducing the market value of their physical assets.9 Second, net worth is reduced
by the “debt deﬂation” effect emphasized by Irving Fisher (1933). In the model, we specify that
the return received by households on time deposits is nominally non-state contingent. Moreover,
the liquidity preference shock generates a surprise fall in the price level as spending declines. This
surprise fall in the price level increases the real payoff to creditors (households) at the expense
of debtors (entrepreneurs). Although there is generally a presumption in macroeconomics that
reallocations of wealth of this type are neutral in the aggregate, in our model they are not. This is
because the reallocation takes funds away from agents who have access to investment opportunities
(i.e., the entrepreneurs) and gives them to people who do not (i.e., the households).10 A third factor
down driving net worth is the general slowdown in economic activity which, by reducing the rental
rate of capital, leads to a reduction in entrepreneurial income.11
Households’ attempts to obtain more currency also induces them to cut back on consumption
expenditures, which further depresses aggregate spending. These effects of the liquidity preference
shock produce, with one exception, responses that resemble thebehavior ofthe U.S. economy from
late 1929 to 1933. The exception is that the mechanism implies a rise in the interest rate, whereas
interest rates actually fell sharply during this period. It turns out, however, that the rise in the
interest rate in response to a liquidity preference shock is small and transient, and is soon followed
by a persistent fall. Although we have not conﬁrmed this, we suspect this fall in the interest rate is
a consequence of the accelerator mechanism implied by the ﬁnancial frictions. Consistent with the
analysis in Friedman and Schwartz (1963), our counterfactual experiment suggests that failure of
the Federal Reserve to respond appropriately to this and other money demand shocks in the 1930s
9Cole and Ohanian (2001) cite evidence that business loans remained relatively strong during the contraction phase
of the depression. They suggest that this evidence represents an embarassment for models of ﬁnancial frictions. It is
useful to note that it is not necessarily a problem for the model considered here. In the model, the fall in asset prices
triggered by a liquidity preference shock is expected to be undone over time. By creating anticipated capital gains,
this raises the prospective return on capital. The nature of the loan contract is such that when this happens, the amount
of loans an entrepreneur receives for a given level of net worth goes up. During the ﬁrst few years of the Great
Depression people, in fact, did think that the end of the output decline was near, and things would return to normal
soon (see Kennedy 1999.)
10This is where our model differs from that in BGG. Because their model is non-monetary, they cannot capture the
debt-deﬂation mechanism. Our way of incorporating this mechanism is consistent with the remarks in the conclusion
of BGG.
11In our model there are additional sources of non-neutrality associated with the entrepreneurs. These stem from
the fact that the liquidity preference shock generates a rise in bankruptcies, which generate real resource costs.
4was the reason that the slump that began in 1929 ultimately became the Great Depression.12
As in the case of the other shocks in our model, our analysis is silent about the fundamental
origins of the liquidity preference shock. We suspect that a more careful analysis of this shock
would lead to the conclusion that it is not invariant to the nature of monetary policy, as we assume
here. In fact, a more accommodative monetary policy might have reduced the volatility of the
liquidity preference shock, as well as of other monetary shocks in the model. So, we think of our
analysis as placing a lower bound on what monetary policy might have achieved in the 1930s. In
addition, an implication of our analysis is that a deeper study of the microeconomic sources of
liquidity preference and other monetary shocks would lead to a better understanding of the Great
Depression, and possibly other business cycle episodes as well.
The second shock that plays an signiﬁcant role in our analysis is particularly important in
the expansion phase of the Great Depression. A puzzle during this phase is that hours worked
recovered only slightly in the period, 1933-1939. T h ee s t i m a t e dm o d e l ’ sa n s w e rt ot h i sp u z z l ei s
t h a tt h e r ew a sar i s ei nt h em a r k e tp o w e ro fw o r k e r s .T h i sf e a t u r eo ft h em o d e la c c o r d sw e l lw i t h
the widespread notion that the policies of the New Deal had the effect of pushing up wages and
reducing employment by giving workers greater bargaining power (Cole and Ohanian 2003.)
In fact, the above story oversimpliﬁes somewhat the account of the Depression implicit in our
estimated model. There are many details that the liquidity preference and market power shocks
miss. Six other shocks in the model ﬁll in those details. All these shocks are pinned down by the
fact that we consider a large range of data in the analysis. The thirteen variables that we consider
are the Dow Jones Industrial average, aggregate output, aggregate employment, the aggregate real
wage, a short-term interest rate, the premium on Baa bonds, the monetary base, M1, inﬂation,
investment, consumption, demand deposits, and bank reserves. We display our model’s implica-
tions for all these variables. The large number of variables imposes substantial discipline on the
analysis.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present an informal discussion
of the data on the Great Depression, as a way to motivate key features of our model. Section
3 presents the formal model economy. Section 4 discusses the assignment of parameter values
and model ﬁt. Section 5 discusses the explanation of the Great Depression that is implicit in our
estimated model. Section 6 discusses the counterfactual analysis. Section 7 concludes. Various
technical details are relegated to appendices.
12To the extent that the Fed chose not to accommodate money demand shocks because it felt constrained by the gold
standard, our analysis of the contraction phase of the Great Depression is consistent with the analysis of Eichengreen
and others, who lay the blame for the Great Depression with the gold standard.
There is some debate over how binding a restriction the gold standard was for monetary policy (Bordo, Choudhri,
and Schwartz 1995).
52 Key Macroeconomic Variables in the Interwar Period
We now brieﬂyreviewtherelevantdataandliteraturethatmotivatethegeneraldesignofourmodel.
It is worth emphasizing both what is in the model, as well as what is not. In terms of the latter, the
model we construct abstracts from international considerations. This choice is motivated by the
arguments of Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz (1995), Romer (1993), and others, which claim that
the U.S. Great Depression can be understood in domestic terms only. Also, we are sympathetic to
the arguments in Romer (1993) and Temin (1976), which maintain that exogenous monetary policy
disturbances were probably not an important impulse driving the Great Depression.13 Our model
abstracts completely from such shocks. We explain what it is about the data that leads us to leave
them out. In addition, our model de-emphasizes somewhat the classical sticky wage mechanism
by which spending shocks have traditionally been assumed to affect real output and employment.14
We explain what it is about the data that leads us to assign a relatively greater role to alternative
mechanisms. As we review the data, we describe the impulse and propagation mechanisms that
we think do warrant further consideration and which are included in our model.
2.1 Aggregate Quantities
Our data are displayed in Figure 1. For convenience, the fourth-quarter observations for 1929 and
later are indicated by an asterisk (*). Consider the real per capita Gross National Product (GNP)
data, which are normalized to unity in 1929.15 Note that these fall by one-third from 1929 to 1933.
13Sims (1999) uses methods based on vector autoregressions to conclude that monetary policy shocks were not an
important source of variation in economic activity.
14See Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2001) for a formal representation of the notion that the Great Depression reﬂected
the effects of contractionary shocks to monetary policy operating on the economy through a sticky wage mechanism.
15Nominal GNP data were taken from Balke and Gordon (1986). GNP was converted to 1929 dollars us-
ing the GNP deﬂator taken from the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Macro History database at
http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/. Real GNP was converted to per capita terms by a measure
of population from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), who derive it from Kendrick (1961) (the data were taken
from Ellen McGrattan’s website). Their measure of population is linearly interpolated to construct quarterly ﬁgures.
Nominal investment includes household purchases of durable goods, investment in equipment, investment in residen-
tial and nonresidential structures, and change in inventories. It was taken from Balke and Gordon (1986). It was
converted to per capita 1929 dollars using the GNP deﬂator and the measure of population. Nominal consumption is
household consumption of nondurable goods and services and is taken from Balke and Gordon (1986). It is converted
to per capita 1929 dollars using the GNP deﬂator and the measure of population. Hours worked is the number of hours
of all employees, plus the self employed, plus those involved in unpaid family work. It includes government hours,
except for hours worked in the military. It is expressed as a ratio to the annual endowment of hours and taken from
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), who build on data from Kendrick (1961). The Dow Jones is taken from the
NBER dataset. It is converted to real per capita terms using the GNP deﬂator and population. Monetary variables are
taken from Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and are converted to per capita terms using our population measure. The
short-term interest rate is the three-month rate on Treasury securities and it is taken from the NBER database. The
interest rate spread is the difference between yields on Baa and Aaa corporate bonds, which are obtained from the
NBER database. The real wage is hourly compensation. It is constructed as follows. Total compensation from NIPA,
available at an annual frequency starting from 1929, is divided by our measure of hours worked and interpolated to
obtain quarterly ﬁgures using the related series of average hourly earnings in manufacturing from Hanes (1996). For
the period 1923-1928 we used average hourly earnings in manufacturing from Hanes (1996). The two series were
6T h er e c o v e r yi sv e r ys l o w ,a n db y1 9 3 9o u t p u ti so n l yb a r e l yb a c kt oi t s1 9 2 9l e v e l .T ou n d e r s t a n d
the composition of these ﬂuctuations, consider the data on consumption and investment in Figure
1. Consumption includes household consumption of nondurables and services, while investment
includes business investment plus household purchases of durable goods. The consumption and
investment data have been divided by the level of output in 1929 to give an indication of their
magnitude in relation to output. Note that the drop in consumption is relatively small, falling
from about 65 percent of the 1929 level of GNP in 1929 to about 50 percent of the 1929 level
of GNP in 1933. The behavior of investment is more dramatic. It drops 80 percent, falling from
25 percent of the 1929 level of GNP in 1929 to 5 percent of that level in 1933. These are the
observations that have motivated researchers to speculate that the key to understanding the start
of the Great Depression lies in understanding the dynamics of investment (see Romer 1993 and
Temin 1976.) Another way to see just how much investment fell is to compare the fall in the
investment-to-output ratio from 1929 to 1933 with the fall in that ratio in other recessions. Table 1
displays the investment-to-output ratio at NBER peaks and troughs for the 1929 recession and for
9 other postwar recessions. In recessions since the Great Depression, reductions in the investment-
to-output ratio have been no greater than 3 percentage points. Results in Cole and Ohanian (2001,
Table 1) indicate that the fall in the investment-to-output ratio in the 1920-1921 recession was also
relatively small. By contrast, the drop in the investment-to-output ratio in the Great Depression,
which was 19 percentage points, was an order of magnitude greater than that which occurred in
these other recessions.
Figure 1 also displays economy-wide per capita hours worked, normalized to unity in 1929.
Employment dropped by roughly 25 percent from 1929 to 1933. Notably, hours worked in the
1930s never recovered much from their low level in 1933. By 1939 they settled to a level about
20 percent below their level in 1929. This observation has led many to conjecture that one set
of factors at work in the recovery phase of the Great Depression may have been institutional and
other changes that led to a permanent reduction in “normal” hours worked per person. Our model
is designed to accommodate such factors using a de v i c et h a ti si nt h es p i r i to ft h ea n a l y s i so f
Cole and Ohanian (2003). In particular, we do so by adopting a model speciﬁcation which allows
households’ labor market power to ﬂuctuate over time.
2.2 Exogenous Monetary Policy Shocks in the Great Depression
There is a general consensus that the initial phase of the contraction began with the slowdown in
economic growth in the summer of 1929, just before the stock market crash. Many researchers
spliced together. Finally, the series is converted to real terms using the GNP deﬂator. We did not use earnings in
manufacturing from Hanes (1996) for the whole sample because wages in manufacturing experienced a much stronger
rise than wages in the other sectors during the 1930s (see Cole and Ohanian 1999.) On the other hand, the measure
of hourly compensation we constructed is not totally satisfactory, as self-employed and unpaid family workers are
included in hours worked but are excluded from the NIPA measure of total compensation.
7follow Keynes’s (1930, p. 196) assessment that that slowdown reﬂected the effects of high interest
rates engineered by the Federal Reserve. Some argue that monetary policy shocks also played an
important role in other phases of the Great Depression. In our analysis of the Great Depression we
abstract from monetary policy shocks altogether. This subsection reviews our reasons for doing
this.
Figure 1, panel F shows that real M1 was roughly constant during the initial phase of the
contraction, 1929-1932 (and also more generally, from about 1926 to the end of 1932). In view
of the substantial drop in output that occurred, this implies that M1 velocity fell. Models that
have performed well with postwar U.S. data generally imply that an exogenous, contractionary
monetary policy shock leads to a fall in real balances and a rise in velocity.16 This is not to say that
monetary policy was not tight at all during this period. For example, the real value of the monetary
base (not shown in Figure 1) did fall, although only by a small amount.17 Still, it seems unlikely
that an exogenous contractionary shock to monetary policy was an important impulse for the Great
Depression. To the extent that there was some tightness in monetary policy, it was relatively small,
certainly by the historical standards of the time (see Romer 1990 for additional discussion).
The spike in the interest rate in late 1931 is sometimes explained as reﬂecting a contractionary
r e s p o n s eb yt h eF e d e r a lR e s e r v et ot h eB r i t i s hd e c i s i o nt oa b a n d o nt h eg o l ds t a n d a r d .S i n c eB r i t i s h
monetary policy was not in any obvious way related to economic developments in the U.S., it is
natural in an analysis of the U.S. Depression experience to treat Britain’s action as an exogenous
s h o c kt oU . S .ﬁnancial markets. But should it be treated as a shock to money supply or money
demand? The continued robust growth in the real, per capita monetary base is not consistent with
the money supply interpretation. In 1931IV, the real monetary base stood 5 percent higher than it
had in 1931III. Then, over the next two quarters the real, per capita monetary base grewat quarterly
rates of 1 percent and 6 percent, respectively. This and other data suggest that the 1931 interest
rate spike is better thought of as reﬂecting a shock to money demand. For example, during this
period, the currency-to-deposit ratio began to rise, and bank reserves in 1931IV were 2 percent
below their level in 1931III. These observations are consistent with the notion that there was a
shift in preferences away from demand deposits. Clearly, this is one way to think of the bank runs
occurring at this time. In addition, it is a way to think of the run on the dollar which was believed
to have been triggered by the British decision on gold.
There are two other episodes that are often interpreted as reﬂecting the operation of monetary
policy shocks. The ﬁrst is the sharp increase in money growth in April to July of 1932, and the
second is a sharp decrease in the period January to March 1933. These monetary actions are
thought to be responsible for the “double dip” nature of the Great Depression. Although it is
16See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003).
17In 1929IV the real monetary base was 5 percent lower than it was in 1928I. Also, Bernanke (2002) reports that
the Fed’s portfolio of government securities fell in the period before the crash.
8not evident in the data presented in Figure 1, data on manufacturing output show a dip in output in
1932, followed by a rise, and then another dip in 1933.18 This pattern closely follows the variations
in money growth. In our analysis we interpret these as reﬂecting the interaction of nonmonetary
policy shocks with the monetary authority’s monetary policy rule.
Finally, there is the switch to a faster money growth rate following the U.S. departure from the
gold standard in April of 1933 (see Figure 1, panel F). In our analysis we model monetary policy
a sas i n g l er e g i m e ,a n ds ow ea b s t r a c tf r o mt h ea p parent change in regime that occurred in 1933.
Incorporating a regime switch into the analysis would be a useful step, which we leave to future
research. Addressing this properly requires taking a potentially controversial stand on the exact
nature of the change in monetary policy, as well as on the nature of the public’s perception of that
change.
2.3 The Sticky Wage Mechanism
In our terminology, the sticky wage mechanism reﬂects two features. First, ﬁrms are assumed to
always be on their labor demand schedule, which itself is not perturbed by shocks to aggregate
spending. Second, nominal wages are sticky.19 As a result, the only way for a negative aggregate
spending shock to reduce employment and output is for the shock to drive the price level down and
t h er e a lw a g eu p . 20 The problem is that there is no evidence, either in the U.S. time-series or in
a cross-section of countries, that the contraction phase of the Great Depression is associated with
a sharp rise in the real wage (for a discussion of the cross-section, see Cole and Ohanian 2003a.)
These considerations lead us to emphasize model features which have been employed in analyses
of postwar data, which allow spending shocks to shift the labor demand schedule. In models with
these features, it is not necessary for the real wage to rise when a spending contraction reduces
output.21
Panel L in Figure 1, displays the economy-wide real wage. Note that there is no evidence that it
surges above trend as output and employment begin their plunge after 1929. Indeed, this measure
18See, for example, Figure IV in Mills (1934).
19The two assumptions just described correspond to equations (1) and (2) of the model used by Bernanke and Carey
(1996). They state that in using this model to analyze the Great Depression, they are following the lead of Eichengreen
and Sachs (1985).
20Although the sticky wage mechanism is often attributed to Keynes, he himself changed his mind about the rela-
tionship between real wages and output after the famous critique by Dunlop and Tarshis. At that time, Keynes blamed
Alfred Marshall for the idea that real wages and output necessarily move in opposite directions. He referred to Mar-
shall’s view as a “dogma” which was, in fact, not consistent with the data. Upon examining data from 1880 and after,
Keynes concluded that the negative relationship between real wages and output held only in the ﬁrst six years of this
period, “the formative period in Marshall’s thought in this matter....but has never once held good in the ﬁfty years since
[Marshall] crystallized it!” (Keynes 1939, p.38).
21Using postwar U.S. data, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003) present evidence based on minimal model
assumptions (using vector autoregression techniques) to argue that a contractionary shock to monetary policy produces
as m a l ldrop in the real wage. They estimate a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model that is consistent with
this ﬁnding.
9of the real wage was actually low in 1932 and 1933, when the economy hit bottom. Aggregate data
for the manufacturing sector do provide some evidence of a rise in the real wage after 1929. For
example, according to Cole and Ohanian (1999, Table 11) the manufacturing wage compiled by
Hanes (1996), converted to real terms using the GNP deﬂator, is about 5 percent above trend during
the period 1930-1932.22 However, the work of Bresnahan and Raff (1991), Lebergott (1989), and
Margo (1993) suggests that this rise may, for compositional reasons, overstate what happened
to the typical manufacturing worker’s real wage. In particular, Bresnahan and Raff (1991) and
Lebergott (1989) report evidence that low-wage jobs were terminated ﬁrst, injecting an upward
bias in standard industry-wide average estimates. Margo (1993, p. 44) concludes that eliminating
the bias due to compositional factors like this ‘...would produce an aggregate decline in nominal
wages between 1929 and 1932 as much as 48 percent larger than that measured by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.’ If the bias were only a little more than one-tenth of Margo’s estimate, then the
rise in the measured manufacturing real wage turns into an outright fall for the typical worker.23
As emphasized by Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2001), there is another issue that must be ad-
dressed before one can draw deﬁnite conclusions from the behavior of manufacturing real wages.
Most of the analyses cited in the previous paragraph convert the nominal manufacturing wage to a
real wage using an aggregate measure of prices. However, the conventional theory pertains not to
this, but to the real wage measured in terms of the price of the ﬁrm’s product. So, it is important to
consider the behavior of the manufacturing wage in relation to some measure of the manufacturing
price level. According to Mills (1934, Table 5), the price index of manufactured goods was 91, 78,
70, and 72 in the years 1930-1933, with the price normalized at 100 in 1929. The measure of the
GNP deﬂator used by Cole and Ohanian (1999, Table 8) is 97, 88, 78, and 77 for the same years,
and with the same normalization. Evidently, with the Mills estimate of manufacturing prices, the
manufacturing real wage is higher by only 5-10 percent. This increase is still substantially smaller
than Margo’s estimate of the magnitude of the composition bias.24
The disaggregated manufacturing data also raise questions about the sticky wage mechanism.
Under the mechanism, a drop in output is fundamentally driven by a fall in the price level, so that
those sectors where price falls the most should have experienced the biggest output decline. Mills
22Cole and Ohanian assume a trend growth rate of 1.9 percent per year for the manufacturing real wage.
23One way to make Margo’s estimate concrete is as follows. According to Cole and Ohanian (1999, Table 11),
the detrended real wage in 1932 stood at 105, with its 1929 value equal to 100. Margo’s calculation suggests that if
composition biases are eliminated from the data, then if the typical wage earner’s wage in 1929 were 100, that worker
earned only 0.52×105=54.6 in 1932.
Unlike the Bureau of Labor Statistics data that Margo is referring to, Hanes’ (1996) data attempt to correct for some
sources of composition bias. The exact magnitude of the composition bias is controversial, with at least one author
(Dighe 1997) claiming it is negligible.
24Sometimes, the wholesale price index is used to deﬂate the manufacturing real wage (see Bernanke and Carey
1996, and Bordo, Erceg, and Evans 2001.) However, as emphasized by Mills (1934, table 2), the prices of manu-
factured goods rose substantially relative to wholesale prices. So, deﬂating nominal manufacturing wages using the
wholesale price index overstates the real cost of labor to manufacturing ﬁrms.
10(1934, Figure V) presents evidence that conﬂicts with this prediction. He shows that in 1932-1933,
production in durable and nondurable manufacturing was about 76 and 31 percent, respectively,
below their 1929 levels. The magnitude of the associated price declines was the reverse of what
the sticky wage mechanism predicts. Mills reports that the price of durables fell only about 22
percent, while the price of nondurables fell about 65 percent.
The U.S. time-series data on the recovery phase of the Great Depression also pose a problem
for the sticky wage mechanism. Note from Figure 1, panel L, that there is no evidence of a surge
down in the real wage, as employment begins to recover in 1934-1936.
In sum, it does not look as though the shock or shocks that are responsible for the U.S. Great
Depression operated through the sticky wage mechanism. There just does not seem to be a tight
negative relationship between the real wage one the one hand, and output and employment on the
other. Accordingly, we adopt a model environment with the property that variables other than just
employment and the real wage enter the labor demand curve. These variables include capacity
utilization and variable markups, as well as the interest rate. The latter enters because our model
takes into account the fact that ﬁrms must borrow working-capital to ﬁnance their variable costs.
In our model, markups vary because of ﬂuctuations in the monopoly power of ﬁrms, as well as
because of frictions in price setting.
Incorporating variable capital utilization into an analysis of the Great Depression is quite nat-
ural. Bresnahan and Raff (1991) show that about 30 percent of the reduction in jobs in the auto-
mobile industry was associated with plant closing, i.e., idle plant and equipment. In his classic
analysis of total factor productivity, Solow (1957) assumes that the rate of capital utilization is the
same as the rate of utilization of the labor force, and so he measures capital utilization by 1 minus
the unemployment rate. This number, of course, falls dramatically during the Great Depression.
Variations in the markup are also natural to consider in view of the many legislative and other
changes in the 1930s, affecting the degree of competition among ﬁrms.25
It has long been recognized that there is a simple alternative way to reconcile the sticky wage
mechanism with an absence of correlation between the real wage and output. That is to assume
that there are exogenous shocks to labor supply, i.e., technology shocks.26 As Bordo, Erceg, and
Evans (2001) note, the fact that the real wage did not surge above trend in 1930-1931 could be
reconciled with the sticky wage mechanism, if we assume there was a negative shock to tech-
nology at the time. Nevertheless, we are skeptical that technology shocks played an important
role during the Great Depression. Analysts have generally concluded that technological change
continued in the 1930s at the same or higher rate than in the 1920s. For example, Field (2001)
concludes, “In spite of tremendous losses due to underutilized labor and capital, the 1930s were,
paradoxically, also an extraordinarily fertile period from the standpoint of technical change, one in
25For an excellent review, see Kennedy (1999).
26This approach has been advocated in Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2003a).
11which a disproportionately large number of key product and process innovations took place.” (See
also, Field 2003.) Other researchers reached similar conclusions.27 For example, Solow (1957,
p. 316) concludes from his total factor productivity measurements, that “...there is some evidence
that technical change (broadly interpreted) may have accelerated after 1929.” Other researchers
who similarly concluded that the pace of technical change continued without interruption after
1929 include Mills (1934; see especially his Table 4) and Bliss (1934; see especially his Table III).
Despite this skepticism, we do include technology shocks into our model. We will let the data
determine whether they are important.
2.4 Other Variables and Mechanisms
There are several variables that exhibit dramatic ﬂuctuations during the Great Depression. One
suspects that they point to important sources of shocks or sources of propagation for other shocks.
For example, Panel H in Figure 1 displays the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DOW), deﬂated by
the GNP deﬂator. Note how dramatically the stock market fell from 1929 to 1933. The magnitude
of the drop is similar to that of investment. It is therefore not surprising that several researchers
have argued that ﬁnancial asset markets must be part of any explanation of the Great Depression.28
We integrate ﬁnancial markets into our environment using the modeling strategy of Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) draw attention to the very large movements in the currency-
to-deposit ratio and the reserves-to-deposit ratio (see Panels I and J, respectively). We follow
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and others in pursuing the idea that these movements have much
to do with the dynamics of the Great Depression. As discussed above, to some extent they reﬂect
the consequences of the bank runs in the 1930s. We do not pursue a “deep” theory of bank runs in
this paper. Instead, we model the movements in the currency-to-deposit ratio and in the reserves-
to-deposit ratio as reﬂecting various exogenous shocks to money demand.
Discussions of risk play a role in analyses of the Great Depression (see, for example, Romer
1990.) According to evidence in Harrison and Weder (2003), concerns about risk were probably
not an important factor at the very beginning of the depression, in late 1929 or early 1930. For
example, the premium on Baa over Aaa corporate bonds does not exhibit a sharp rise until the ﬁrst
wave of bank runs, in late 1930 (see Figure 1, panel K). However, the premium is so much larger
27An example is Bliss (1934, p. 6): “A period of depression is conducive to improvement in labor productivity.
Faced with narrowing proﬁt margins, businessmen strive for cheaper, more direct, more efﬁcient methods of produc-
tion. With overhead costs per unit increasing special effort is made to reduce direct costs per unit, largely by laying
off the less efﬁcient workers and by improving management.” Commenting on his estimates that the productivity of
employed labor exhibited strong growth in the period 1929-1932, Bliss (1934, p. 7) remarks, “Taken together, these
estimates indicate an increase in output per man-hour of approximately 25 percent in four years, an amazing advance
indeed.” Mills attributed some, but not all, of the advance in productivity to temporary factors.
28See, for example, Bernanke (2002), Cecchetti (1998), Fisher (1933), Mishkin (1978), Romer (1993), and Temin
(1976).
12in the mid-1930s than it was throughout the 1920s, that it may have played a role in prolonging the
Great Depression, perhaps by keeping investment low.29 Our way of introducing ﬁnancial asset
markets into the analysis allows for increased risk to affect investment.
In the previous subsection we discussed how the behavior of the real wage leads us to incor-
porate mechanisms that shift labor demand. A similar issue arises in the case of labor supply. The
data suggest ﬁnding mechanisms that shift labor supply or, put households “off their labor supply
schedule.” The question that must be confronted from the point of view of labor supply is why did
household labor effort fall so sharply, even though the real wage continued on its trend set in the
1920s? Of course, this is a classic puzzle that confronts equilibrium analyses of business cycles
generally. Hall (1997) gave the puzzle a quantitative expression by showing that an equilibrium
approach to business ﬂuctuations leads to the implication that households are hit by a shock that
resembles an increased preference for leisure in a recession (see also Ingram, Kocherlakota, and
Savin 1997 and Parkin 1988.) Applying the approach of Hall, who works with postwar data, Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and Mulligan (2002) ﬁnd that the early phase of the Great Depres-
sion is also characterized by an upward shift in the preference for leisure. This shift has various
interpretations. For example, it can be interpreted as reﬂecting an increase in the labor market
power of households, which leads them to restrict the supply of their labors e r v i c e s . F o l l o w i n g
Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002), it can also reﬂect that households are, in effect, “off their
labor supply schedules,” because of the presence of sticky wages. These considerations lead us to
incorporate household labor market power and frictions in wage setting into our model.
An unusual feature of the Great Depression is that, in the estimation of Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2002) and Mulligan (2002), the shock that resembles a preference for leisure does not
fall again in the recovery phase, as Hall shows it does in postwar recessions. This is a manifestation
o ft h ef a c tt h a te m p l o y m e n tr o s es ol i t t l e( s e eP a n el D, Figure 1) in the recovery phase, even though
real wage continued strong. The standard explanation is that this reﬂects the effects of New Deal
programs designed to prop up the real wage.30 This is another reason that our model speciﬁcation
allows for ﬂuctuations in household labor market power.
The preceding considerations suggest to us that a model that captures the key forces in play
during the Great Depression must have several features:
• It must capture the determinants of investment behavior. To be interesting, these deter-
minants should include a possible role for changes in the value of ﬁnancial assets and in
perceptions of risk.
29A related possibility is raised by the analysis in Bernanke (1983). This suggests that the rise in the risk premium
and the fall in investment may both have been a consequence of the damage done to the banking system by the
banking panics. See Gertler (2001) for a more extensive discussion of the premium in Baa over Aaa bonds. He
expresses skepticism that the premium reﬂects risk alone.
30See Bordo, Erceg and Evans (2000), Cole and Ohanian (2003), and Temin (1989, 1990).
13• The real side of the economy should incorporate disturbances to the labor demand schedule,
including time-varying markups, capacity utilization, and other variables.
• The model should include frictions in the setting of wages and should allow for ﬂuctuations
in the monopoly power of households.
• The model should incorporate a banking system which is rich enough that one can consider
the interactions between real economic activity and various monetary aggregates such as
currency, bank reserves, and demand deposits.
A model that integrates all these features in a coherent way would constitute a credible laboratory
for assessing whether an improved monetary policy might have ameliorated the Great Depres-
sion. In this paper we take a step towards constructing such a model by combining the models of
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003), BGG and Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995).
3 The Model Economy
In this section we describe our model economy and display the optimization problems solved
by intermediate- and ﬁnal-goods ﬁrms, entrepreneurs, producers of physical capital, banks, and
households. Final output is produced using the usual Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of intermediate
inputs. Intermediate inputs are produced by monopolists, who set prices using a variant of the
approach described in Calvo (1983). These ﬁrms hire the services of capital and labor, and we
assume that a fraction of these costs (“working-capital”) must be ﬁnanced in advance through
banks. Labor services are an aggregate of specialized services, each of which is supplied by a
monopolist household. Households set wages subject to the type of frictions modeled in Calvo
(1983).31
Capital services are supplied by entrepreneurs, who own the physical stock of capital and
choose how intensely to utilize it. Our model of the entrepreneurs closely follows BGG. In partic-
ular, the entrepreneurs have their own ﬁnancial wealth, but not enough to ﬁnance the full amount
of capital they own. Part of what they own must be ﬁnanced by bank loans. Lending to en-
trepreneurs involves agency costs, because the capital purchased by entrepreneurs is subject to an
idiosyncratic productivity shock. The only way the lender can observe this shock is by expending
valuable resources in monitoring, so that it is efﬁcient to adopt a lending contract that economizes
on monitoring costs. We assume the borrower receives a standard debt contract, which speciﬁes
a loan amount and an amount to be repaid in the event the borrower is solvent. A borrower who
cannot repay is said to be bankrupt, and turns over everything to the lender, after being monitored.
The rate of return paid by solvent entrepreneurs must be high enough to cover the cost of funds
31This aspect of the model follows Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003), who in turn build on Erceg, Hender-
son, and Levin (2000).
14to the bank, as well as monitoring costs net of whatever the bank can salvage from bankrupt en-
trepreneurs. The excess of this rate of return over the cost of funds to the bank is the external
ﬁnance premium. Being an endogenous variable, the magnitude of the premium is a function of all
the shocks in the model. Among these, one that plays a notable role is the variance of the idiosyn-
cratic shock to entrepreneurial productivity. We assume that this is the realization of a stochastic
process. The bank obtains the funds that it lends to entrepreneurs by issuing time deposit contracts
to households. Because these contracts pay a nominal non-state contingent return, the model can
at least qualitatively account for the debt deﬂa t i o np h e n o m e n o ne m p h a s i z e db yF i s h e r( 1 9 3 3 ) ,a s
discussed in the introduction.
As in most models of credit market frictions, there is a tendency for entrepreneurs to “grow”
away from the ﬁnancial constraint by accumulating enough wealth. To ensure that the credit mar-
ket restrictions remain binding, we follow BGG in assuming that a randomly selected fraction of
entrepreneurial ﬁnancial wealth is destroyed exogenously each period. The fraction is itself sub-
ject to stochastic ﬂuctuations. A jump in the rate of destruction of entrepreneurial ﬁnancial wealth
resembles in some respects the bursting of a stock market bubble.
The frictions in the entrepreneurial sector have the effect of amplifying the output effects of
certain types of shocks. This is the “accelerator eff ec t”e m ph as iz edbyB G G .T os eet hi s,i ti sus ef ul
to understand the evolution of entrepreneurial net worth. In a given period, net worth is equal to
what it was in the previous period, plus earnings from renting capital, plus the current market value
of the stock of capital, minus obligations to banks arising from past loans. As a result, a shock that
reduces the rental rate of capital or its market value produces a fall in investment by reducing
entrepreneurial net worth. Similarly, as noted above, a shock that reduces the aggregate price level
reduces net worth by raising the real value of entrepreneurial debt payments. Thus, the ﬁnancial
frictions amplify the effects of shocks that reduce output and either the rental rate of capital or the
aggregate price level.
In addition to amplifying the effects of certain shocks originating outside the entrepreneurial
sector, the model also posits new shocks that originate within the sector itself, and which can
be useful for understanding macroeconomic dynamics. A “bursting stock market bubble” has
a depressive effect on investment because the destruction of entrepreneurial wealth inhibits the
ability of entrepreneurs to buy capital. Also, an increase in the riskiness of entrepreneurs leads to
a fall in investment because the rise in interest payments to banks cuts into their net worth.
The actual production of physical capital is carried out by capital-producing ﬁrms, which com-
bine old capital and investment goods to produce new, installed, capital. The production of new
capital involves adjustment costs, so that the price of capital increases with the amount of capital
sold. There are no ﬁnancing problems or agency costs in the capital-producing sector. Inputs in
this sector are ﬁnanced out of contemporaneous receipts from production.
All ﬁnancial intermediation activities occur in a representative, competitive “bank.” This bank
15isinvolvedintwoseparableactivities. Inoneitmakesloanstoentrepreneurs, whichareﬁnancedby
issuing time deposits to households. In the other, it makes working-capital loans to intermediate-
goods producers, which are ﬁnanced by issuing demand deposits to households. Total demand
deposits are composed of these household demand deposits, plus ﬁrm demand deposits created
automaticallywhenabankextendsworking-capitalloans. Banksarerequiredtosetasideafraction
of total demand deposit liabilities in the form of reserves. Associated with demand deposits is a
ﬂow of transactions services. The bank produces these using a neoclassical production function
involving labor, capital, and reserves in excess of what is required. The presence of excess reserves
in the production function is meant to capture, in a reduced-form way, the liquidity needs that arise
ina bankingsystemwherebanksclear demanddeposit checks amongeachother. The bank’s assets
and liabilities match in their maturity structu r ea n da r er i s kf r e e .
We now discuss the different sectors of the model in more detail.
3.1 Firms
A ﬁnal good, Yt, is produced by a perfectly competitive, representative ﬁrm. It does so by combin-









Here, 1 ≤ λf,t < ∞, and Yjt denotes the time-t input of intermediate good j. Let Pt and Pjt denote
the time-t price of the consumption good and intermediate good j, respectively. The ﬁrm chooses
Yjt and Yt to maximize proﬁts, taking prices as given. The parameter, λf,t, is a realization of a
stochastic process, to be discussed below. Because a higher value of λf,t implies that intermediate
goods are less substitutable for each other, intermediate-goods ﬁr m sh a v em o r em a r k e tp o w e r ,t h e
higher is λf,t.
The jth intermediate good is produced bya monopolist who sets its price, Pjt, subject to Calvo-
style frictions that will be described shortly. The intermediate-goods producer is required to satisfy
whatever demand materializes at its posted price. Given quantity demanded, the intermediate-










, 0 <α<1, (2)
where Φ is a ﬁxed cost and Kjt and ljt denote the services of capital and labor. The variable, zt, is
the trend growth rate in technology, with
zt = µzzt−1.
16The variable,  t, is a stationary shock to technology. The time-series representation of  t is dis-
cussed below.
Intermediate-goods ﬁrms are competitive in factor markets, where they confront a rental rate,
Prk
t, on capital services and a wage rate, Wt, on labor services. Each of these is expressed in units
of money. Also, each ﬁrm must ﬁnance a fraction, ψk, of its capital services expenses in advance.
Similarly, it must ﬁnance a fraction, ψl, of its labor services in advance. The interest rate it faces
for this type of working-capital loan is Rt.
We adopt the variant of Calvo pricing proposed in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003).
In each period, t, a fraction of intermediate-goods ﬁrms, 1 − ξp, can reoptimize its price. The
complementary fraction must set its price equal to what it was in time-t − 1,s c a l e du pb yt h e
inﬂation rate from t − 2 to t − 1,π t−1.
3.2 Capital Producers
T h e r ei sal a r g e ,ﬁxed number of identical capital producers. They are competitive and take prices
as given. They are owned by households, who receive any proﬁts or losses in the form of lump-
sum transfers. Capital producers purchase previously installed capital, x, and investment goods,
It, and combine these to produce new installed capital. Investment goods are purchased in the
goods market at price Pt. The time-t price of previously installed capital is denoted by Q ¯ K0,t. New
capital, x0, is produced using the following technology:
x
0 = x + F(It,I t−1).
The presence of lagged investment reﬂects that there are costs to changing the ﬂow of investment.
Since the marginal rate of transformation from previously installed capital to new capital is unity,
the price of new capital is also Q ¯ K0,t. The ﬁrm’s time-t proﬁts are:
Π
k
t = Q ¯ K0,t [x + F(It,I t−1)] − Q ¯ K0,tx − PtIt.













where Et is the expectation conditional on the time-t information set, which includes all time-t
shocks.
Let ¯ Kt+j denote the beginning-of-time t+j physical stock of capital in the economy, and let δ
denote its rate of depreciation. From the capital producer’s problem it is evident that any value of
xt+j whatsoever is proﬁt maximizing. Thus, setting xt+j =( 1− δ) ¯ Kt+j is consistent with proﬁt
maximization and market clearing. The stock of capital evolves as follows
¯ Kt+1 =( 1− δ) ¯ Kt + F(It,I t−1).
173.3 Entrepreneurs
The details are presented in BGG, so our discussion of the entrepreneurs can be brief. Because of
linearity assumptions, aggregate decisions can be represented as functions of aggregates only. This
greatly simpliﬁes the computational analysis. In addition, we exploit this property of the model
in the following presentation. At the end of time-t, the state of an entrepreneur is summarized by
his net worth, Nt+1 (see Figure 2). The net worth, in combination with a bank loan, is used to
purchase the time-t stock of installed capital, ¯ Kt+1. After the purchase, each entrepreneur draws
an idiosyncratic shock which changes ¯ Kt+1 to ω ¯ Kt+1.H e r e ,ω is a unit mean, lognormal random
variable distributed independently over time and across entrepreneurs. The standard-deviation of
log(ω) at date t, σt, is itself a stochastic process. Although the realization of ω is not known at
t h et i m et h ee n t r e p r e n e u rm a k e si ts capital decision, the value of σt is known. The properties of
this random variable are described below. In a slight abuse of previous notation, we write the
distribution function of ω as Ft :
Pr[ω ≤ x]=Ft(x).
After observing the time-t +1aggregate shocks, the entrepreneur decides on the time-t +1level
of capital utilization,u t+1, and then rents out capital services, Kt+1 = ut+1 ¯ Kt+1. High capital













For an entrepreneur who receives idiosyncratic productivity shock, ω, the rate of return on capital
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t+1 is the average rate of return on capital across all entrepreneurs.
We suppose that Nt+1 <Q ¯ K0,t ¯ Kt+1, where Q ¯ K0,t ¯ Kt+1 is the cost of the capital purchased by
entrepreneurs with net worth, Nt+1. Since the entrepreneur does not have enough net worth to pay
for his capital, he must borrow the rest:
Bt+1 = Q ¯ K0,t ¯ Kt+1 − Nt+1 ≥ 0. (3)
18We suppose that the entrepreneur receives a standard debt contract from the bank. This speciﬁes a
loan amount, Bt+1, and a gross rate of interest, Zt+1, to be paid if ω is high enough. Entrepreneurs
who draw ω below a cutoff level, ¯ ωt+1, cannot pay this interest rate and must give everything they







Q ¯ K0,t ¯ Kt+1 = Zt+1Bt+1. (4)
The bank ﬁnances its time-t loans to entrepreneurs, Bt+1, by borrowing from households. We
assume the bank pays households a nominal rate of return, Re
t+1, that is not contingent upon the
realizationoft+1shocks. Asnotedabove, thisistheassumptionthatallowsourmodeltoarticulate
Fisher’s (1933) “debt deﬂation” hypothesis. With this assumption, we depart from BGG, who
assume that the return received by the household is noncontingent in real terms. We suspect that
our speciﬁcation is easier to reconcile with competition in banking than BGG’s. In an environment
like ours, which is dominated by shocks which drive consumption and the price level in the same
direction, a nominally non-state contingent return to households has the effect of shifting business
cycle risk from households to entrepreneurs. This is efﬁcient and an outcome of competition when,
as is the case in our model, entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and households are risk-averse. We have
not explored whether the distribution of risk associated with our market arrangements is optimal
or even close to optimal. We leave this for future work.
In the usual way, the parameters of the entrepreneur’s debt contract are chosen to maximize
entrepreneurial utility, subject to zero proﬁts in each state of nature for the bank and to the require-
ment that Re
t+1 be uncontingent upon time-t +1shocks. This implies that Zt+1 and ¯ ωt+1 are both
functions of time-t +1aggregate shocks. A feature of the loan contract is that
Q ¯ K0,t ¯ Kt+1
Nt+1
is independent of the entrepreneur’s net worth. Aggregation in the model is trivial because of the
fact that borrowing and capital purchases are proportional to an entrepreneur’s level of net worth.




















Q ¯ K0,t−1 ¯ Kt
Q ¯ K0,t−1 ¯ Kt − ¯ Nt
#
(Q ¯ K0,t−1 ¯ Kt − Nt)} + W
e
t .
Here, γt reﬂects that at the end of the period, after the entrepreneur has sold his capital, paid off
his debt and earned rental income, he exits the economy with probability 1 −γt. At the same time
af r a c t i o n ,1 − γt, of entrepreneurs enters. The fraction, γt, who survive and the fraction, 1 − γt,
who enter both receive a transfer, We
t . Without this transfer, entering entrepreneurs would have no
net worth, and so they would not be able to buy any capital, ever. Also, among the γt entrepreneurs
19who survive there are some who are bankrupt and have no net worth. Without a transfer they, too,
would never again be able to buy capital.
The ﬁrst term in braces in (5) represents the revenues from selling capital, plus the rental
income of capital, net of the costs of utilization, averaged across all entrepreneurs. The object in
square brackets is the average gross rate of return paid by all entrepreneurs on time-t − 1 loans,
(Q ¯ K0,t−1 ¯ Kt − ¯ Nt). This aggregates over payments received from entrepreneurs who are bankrupt,
as well as those who are not. The (1 − γt) entrepreneurs who are selected for death, consume:
PtC
e
t = Θ(1 − γt)Vt,
where Vt is their net worth. In practice, we set Θ =0 .
Following BGG, we deﬁne the “external ﬁnance premium” as the term involving µ in square
brackets in (5). It is the difference between the “internal cost of funds,” 1+Re
t, and the expected
cost of borrowing to an entrepreneur. The reason for calling 1+Re
t the internal cost of funds is
that, in principle, one could imagine the entrepreneur using his net worth to acquire time deposits,
instead of physical capital (the model does not formally allow this). In this sense, the opportunity





t , to households. Part of this is set aside in the form of reserves, and the other is used to ﬁnance
working-capital loans. Working capital loans are extended to ﬁrms in the form of demand deposits,
D
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In (6), 0 <α<1, and xb is a constant. In addition, ξt ∈ (0,1) is a shock to the relative value of
excess reserves, Er
t. The stochastic process governing this shock will be discussed later. As noted
above, we include excess reserves as an input to the production of demand deposit services as a
reduced-form way to capture the precautionary motive of a bank concerned about the possibility
of unexpected withdrawals.
Demand deposits pay interest, Rat. We denote the interest rate on working-capital loans, net
of interest on the associated demand deposits, by Rt. Since ﬁrms receive interest on the deposits
associated with their loans, the gross interest payment on loans is Rt+Rat. The maturity of time-t
20working-capital loans and the associated demand deposit liabilities coincide. A time-t working-
capital loan is extended prior to production in time-t and pays off after production in time-t.T h e
household deposits funds into the bank before production in time-t and liquidates the deposit after
production occurs.
Turning to time deposits, we assume the bank faces no costs for maintaining this type of li-
ability. The maturity structure of time deposits coincides with that of the standard debt contract
offered to entrepreneurs. Thus, time deposits and entrepreneurial loans are created at the end of a
given period’s goods market. This is when newly constructed capital is sold by capital producers to
entrepreneurs. Time deposits and entrepreneurial loans pay off near the end of next period’s goods
market, when the entrepreneurs sell their undepreciated capital to capital producers (who use it as
raw material in the production of new capital). The timing of the payoff on the entrepreneurial loan
coincides with the timing of the payoff on time deposits. The maturity structure of the two types
of bank liabilities can be seen in Figure 3.
The entrepreneur/time-deposit side and the working-capital/demand-deposit side of the bank
can be considered separately. The former was considered in the previous subsection. The proﬁt











































t denote capital and labor services hired by the banking sector. Note our assumption
that a fraction ofthese must bepaid inadvance with working-capital. Also, Sw
t represents working-
capital loans, so that Sw
t = D
f
t .T h e t e r m , Ft, denotes loans of reserves between banks. Since
banks are all identical, equilibrium requires Ft =0 . Still, the presence of Ft allows us to deﬁne the
interest rate on interbank loans, Rb
t.
The clearing condition in the market for working-capital loans is:
S
w
t = ψlWtlt + ψkPtr
k
tKt, (7)
where lt and Kt denote economy-wide aggregate labor and capital services. Here, Sw
t represents
the supply of loans, and the terms on the right of the equality in (7) represent total demand.
3.5 Households
There is a continuum of households, each indexed by j ∈ (0,1). Households consume; decide
how to allocate their wealth between demand deposits, currency, and time deposits; and supply a
specialized labor input, hjt. Since the household is a monopoly supplier of its labor service, it can
s e ti t sw a g er a t e .W ea s s u m et h a ti tf a c e sC a l v o( 1 9 83)-type frictions in the setting of this wage.
21Since this uncertainty is idiosyncratic in nature, different households work different amounts and
earn different wage rates. So, in principle, they are also heterogeneous with respect to consump-
tion and asset holdings. A straightforward extension of the arguments in Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin (2000) establishes that the existence of state-contingent securities ensures that in equilib-
rium households are homogeneous with respect to consumption and asset holdings. We assume,
though we do not discuss, the presence of these securities. Given these considerations, our nota-
tion assumes that households are homogeneous with respect to consumption and asset holdings,
and heterogeneous with respect to the wage rate that they earn and the hours they worked.
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(8)
where Ct denotes time-t consumption; υt is a unit-mean liquidity preference shock; and ζt is a
shock with mean unity to the preference for leisure. This shocki si s o m o r p h i ct oas h o c kt ot h e
household’s degree of monopoly power in the supply of hjt. When b>0, (8) allows for habit
f o r m a t i o ni nc o n s u m p t i o n . 32 The term in square brackets captures the notion that currency, Mt,
and demand deposits, Dh
t , contribute to utility by facilitating transactions. It is because υt affects
the magnitude of these non-pecuniary liquidity services that we refer to it as a liquidity preference
shock.
We now discuss the household’s time-t sources and uses of funds. At the beginning of the
period, the household is in possession of the economy’s stock of high-powered money, Mb
t, which




t ≥ Mt + At. (9)
The central bank credits the household’s bank deposit, Dh




t = At + Xt. (10)
As already mentioned, the household receives interest, Rat, on these deposits. Additional sources
of funds include proﬁts from producers of capital, from banks, from intermediate-goods ﬁrms, and
from the net payoff on the state contingent securities mentioned above. Households also receive
lump-sum transfers corresponding to the net worth of the entrepreneurs who exit the economy in
32Various authors, such as Fuhrer (2000), McCallum and Nelson (1999), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2003), have argued that b>0 is important for understanding the monetary transmission mechanism in the postwar
period. In addition, habit formation is useful for understanding other aspects of the economy, including the size of the
premium on equity (see, for example, Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher 2001.)
22the current period. Finally, the households pay a lump-sum tax to ﬁnance transfer payments to
surviving entrepreneurs and to the newly born entrepreneurs.
The household can use its funds to purchase consumption goods, PtCt, or accumulate high-
powered money, Mb
t+1. In addition, it can use its funds to acquire time deposits, Tt. These pay a
rate of return, Re
t+1, at the end of the time-t +1goods market. The rate of return, Re
t+1, is known
in time-t.









Wj,thj,t + Mt + Lumpt (11)
≥ M
b
t+1 + Tt + PtCt,
where Lumpt summarizes the lump sum transfers. The household’s problem is to maximize (8)
subject to (9), (10), and (11).
We now turn to the way the jth household sets its time-t wage, Wj,t. We follow closely the
setup in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). In time-t, the household can, withprobability1−ξw,
choose its wage rate optimally. It turns out that each household that sets its wage optimally sets
it to the same value, which we denote, ˜ Wt. With probability ξw, the household must follow a rule
of thumb by setting its time-t wage to what it was in the previous period, scaled up by πt−1µz.























Also, ls in (12) represents employment services, which are related to the differentiated labor ser-









, 1 ≤ λw < ∞.
T h eh o u s e h o l dt a k e st h ea g g r e g a t ew a g ea n de m p l oyment index as given. The household that reop-
timizes its wage, ˜ Wt, does so by optimizing (8) subject to (11) and the various frictions discussed
above. In the linear approximation of our model’s solution, λw and the preference parameter, ζ,
are observationally equivalent. From here on, we treat ζ as the realization of a stochastic process
and refer to it as a measure of household labor market power. For further details on the sticky wage
part of our model, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003) or Erceg, Henderson, and Levin
(2000).
233.6 Final-Goods-Market Clearing
Here, we develop the aggregate resource constraint, relating the quantity of ﬁnal goods produced
to the quantity of aggregate labor and capital services, as well as to the distribution of production
among intermediate-goods ﬁrms and to the distribution of employment among households. Our









































The endogenous variable, νt, represents the fraction of aggregate labor and capital services used
in the goods-producing sector. The objects, W∗
t and Wt, represent differently weighted integrals
of Wjt over all j, a n ds i m i l a r l yf o rP∗
t and Pt. The scalars, w∗
t and p∗
t, capture the loss of ﬁnal
output that occurs when resources are not evenly distributed across sectors, as efﬁciency requires.
There is no efﬁciency loss when all wages and intermediate-goods prices are equal, so that p∗
t =
w∗
t =1 . The price and wage frictions that we assume imply that p∗
t = w∗
t =1only holds in a
nonstochastic steady state. The reasoning in Yun (1996) can be used to show that in the type of
linear approximation about steady state that we study here, we can set p∗
t = w∗
t =1 .We do this
from here on.
To complete our discussion, ﬁnal goods are allocated to monitoring for banks, utilization costs




















Here, government consumption is modeled as follows:
Gt = ztg,
where g is a constant.
3.7 Exogenous Shocks
There are eight exogenous shocks in the model. These are the monopoly power parameter, λf,t,
corresponding to intermediate-goods ﬁrms; the parameter controlling bank demand for excess re-
serves, ξt; the parameter controlling household preferences for currency versus demand deposits,
24θt; the monopoly power parameter for household labor supply, ζt; the parameter governing house-
hold preference for liquidity, υt; the productivity shock to intermediate-goods ﬁrms,  t; the shock
to the riskiness of entrepreneurs, σt; and the parameter governing the survival probability of en-
trepreneurs, γt.
Three of our variables, γt,ξ t, and θt, must lie inside the unit interval. Let yt denote one of
these variables. We ensure that yt lies inside the unit interval by assuming that it is generated by a
stochastic process, xt, via the following transformation:
yt =
1
1+e x p ( −xt)
. (15)
Note that xt ∈ (−∞,∞) maps yt into the unit interval. If we let dxt denote a small perturbation
of xt about its nonstochastic steady state value, and let ˆ yt = dyt/y, where y is the nonstochastic
steady state of yt,t h e n
dyt = y(1 − y)dxt. (16)
Forthecasesinwhichyt isγt,ξ t or θt,w ea l l o wdxt tohaveaﬁrst-orderautoregressive, movingav-
erage(ARMA(1,1))representation. Weallow ˆ λf,t, ˆ υt,ˆ ζt,andˆ  t tohaveARMA(1,1)representations.



































Because at time-t, ˆ σt−1 enters the model [see (5)], and because of the nature of the computational

































We stack all our random variables into the 24 by 1 vector, Ψt, which evolves as follows:
Ψt = ρΨt−1 + Dϕt, (17)
where ρ is 24 by 24 and D is 24 by 8.
3.8 Monetary Policy
The ability of the monetary authority to affect the economy stems from its control over the mone-






25Here, xt is the net growthrate of the monetarybase. Intheliterature, monetarypolicyismodeledin
a variety of ways. For example, policy is often represented as an interest rate target that varies with
economic conditions in a particular way. The notion is that the monetary authority manipulates the
monetarybasetoensurethatthetargetisachieved. Speciﬁcation ofthetargetis often controversial.
For example, “economic conditions” may be represented by deviations from a long-term trend,
or by deviations from some ﬂexible price level of output. Moreover, in models like ours with
endogenous state variables, the “ﬂexible level of output” is itself controversial.33 For the purpose
of estimating our model, we do not need to take a stand on what the target of monetary policy is, or
how that target varies with the state of the economy. We pursue the insight that whatever rule the
monetary authority follows, it corresponds to a particular reduced-form feedback function from the
shocks in the economy to the monetary base. It implies such a representation even if the monetary
authority does not actually see the shocks.
Let ˆ xt denote the percent deviation of xt from its mean value of x, so that ˆ xt =( xt − x)/x.











for i =0 ,1,...,p, with θ
0
0 ≡ 1. In our analysis, p =8 , and we suppose that for i =0 ,x 0,t represents
an exogenous component to monetary policy. Although we set this to zero in the estimation of our
model, a simulation of the response of our model to monetary policy shocks will nevertheless be
useful for interpreting the results of our counterfactual analysis.
Itisalsousefultospelloutinmoredetailtheresponseofthemonetarybasetoashock. Iterating

















(ˆ xj +1 ).













t+1 denote the value of the monetary base in the event that there is no shock, with Mb














33See Woodford (2003, Chapter 5) for additional discussion.
26Making use of (18), we conclude that if there is a one-standard-deviation perturbation, σi, in ϕi,1






























3.9 Equilibrium and Model Solution
We adopt a standard sequence-of-markets equilibrium concept, and we use the method in Chris-
tiano (2002), described in the appendix, to develop a linear approximation to the equilibrium quan-
tities and prices. The solution is a set of matrices, A, B and a core set of 23 endogenous variables
contained in the vector, ˜ zt, satisfying
˜ zt = A˜ zt−1 + BΨt. (19)
Here, A is 23 by 23 and B is 23 by 24 for i =1 ,2. The vector, ˜ zt, is deﬁned in the appendix. Each
element in ˜ zt is expressed as a percent deviation from a steady state value, so that, in nonstochastic
steady state, ˜ zt =0 . From the variables in ˜ zt and the various equilibrium relationships in the
model, it is possible to compute any desired equilibrium variable. Suppose these are contained in
the vector, Xt. After linearization, let the relationship of Xt to ˜ zt and Ψt be expressed as follows:
Xt = α + τzt +¯ τzt−1 + τ
sΨt, (20)
where α, τ, ¯ τ,and τs are functions of the model parameter values and its steady state. The set of
variables of interest in our analysis is:
Xt =
⎛




































t and V b
t are the time-t velocity of M1 and the monetary base, respectively. Also, dc
t and
dr
t represent the currency to demand deposit ratio and the bank reserves to demand deposit ratio,
respectively. As noted in section 3.4, Rb
t is the interest rate on interbank loans. It is determined by
27an arbitrage condition.34 Finally, Pe
t is the external ﬁnance premium, which was discussed at the
end of section 3.3.
In our analysis we use the value of equity as measured by the real value of the DOW, as
an indicator of Nt+1/Pt. This deserves comment because our model of entrepreneurs does not
allow any role for equity ﬁnance. The entrepreneurs in our model resemble small shopkeepers
and farmers, who do not issue equity and who must ﬁnance their ownership of capital with a
combination of their own net worth and bank loans. Although it is probably true that most capital
was owned by small proprietors like this in the 1920s and 1930s, we believe it is hard to obtain
good, direct estimates of their net worth. Our analysis in effect assumes that the DOW constitutes
a useful, albeit indirect, measure.
4 Model Estimation and Fit
Our aim in choosing parameter values is to produce a quantitative model that resembles key as-
pects of the U.S. economy in the 1920s and 1930s. This is what we need in order to have a credible
laboratory for evaluating the consequences of alternative, counterfactual, monetary policies. The
model parameters are divided into two sets: (i) those that govern the evolution of the exogenous
shocks and the monetary response to them, and (ii) the rest. We begin with the latter. We then
estimate the stochastic parameters in (i) by a maximum likelihood procedure. Ideally, we would
have estimated all parameters simultaneously. However, computational challenges make this strat-
egy less than straightforward, and we leave such an exercise for future work. After discussing the
model parameter estimates, we discuss the quality of model ﬁt.
4.1 Parameters of the Nonstochastic Part of the Model
The nonstochastic model parameters are listed in Table 2, and various properties of the model’s
steady state are reported in Tables 3-4. In many cases, the corresponding sample averages for U.S.
data from both the 1920s and the postwar period are also reported. Our procedure for computing
the steady state is discussed in the Appendix.
To compute the steady state, we found it convenient to proceed by specifying some of the
economicallyendogenousvariablestobeexogenous. Inparticular, weassignedvaluestothesteady
state ratio of currency-to-monetary base, m, the steady state rental rate of capital, rk, the steady
state share of capital and labor in goods production, ν, and the steady state share of government
consumption of goods, G/Y. These were set to m =0 .70,r k =0 .043, ν =0 .99, and G/Y =0 .07.






where her,t denotes the derivative of the right side of (6) with respect to real excess reserves, er
t = Er
t /Pt.
28The currency-to-base ratio is a little high relative to the data from the 1920s. The value of rk may
a l s ob eal i t t l eh i g hb e c a u s et h em o d e li m p l i e sav a l ue of the capital output ratio that is a little low,
compared with our data on the 1920s (see Table 3). To make these four variables exogenous for
purposes of computing the steady state required making four model parameters endogenous. For
this purpose, we chose ψL,x b,ξ ,and g.
T h em o d e lp a r a m e t e r si nT a b l e2a r eo r g a n i z e dby sector. Turning to the household sector,
values for β, λw,ξ w,σ L, and b were taken from Altig et al. (2003). The parameters, θ, υ, and σq
were set exogenously. Regarding the goods-producing sector, all but one of the parameters were
taken from Altig et al. (2003). The exception is ψk, which does not appear in Altig et al. (2003).
We set this exogenously.
The Calvo price and wage stickiness parameters, ξp and ξw, imply that the amount of time
between reoptimization of prices and wages is 1/2 year and 1 year, respectively. As noted in Altig
et al. (2003), these values are consistent with recent survey evidence on price frictions.
Our selection of parameter values for the entrepreneurial sector is based on the calibration
discussion in BGG. Following them, we assume that the idiosyncratic shock to entrepreneurs,
ω, has a lognormal distribution. We impose on our calibration the condition that the number of
bankruptcies in steady state corresponds roughly to the number reported by BGG for the post-
World War II period. In particular, we set F(¯ ω) to 0.008, so that, on average, 0.8 percent of
ﬁrms fail to meet their debt obligations in a given quarter. To understand how we were able to
specify F(¯ ω) exogenously, recall that the lognormal distribution has two parameters - the mean
and variance of logω. We set the mean of ω to unity. We are left with one degree of freedom, the
variance of logω. Conditional on the other parameters of the model, this can be set to ensure the
exogenously set value of F(¯ ω). The value of this variance is reported in Table 2. Finally, as noted
above, the two parameters of the banking sector are an output of the steady state calculations.
The steady state implications of the model can be compared with the corresponding empirical
quantities in Tables 3 - 5. There are ﬁve things worth emphasizing about Table 3. First, as noted
above, the capital-to-output ratio in the model is a little low. Corresponding to this, the investment-
to-output ratio is low and the consumption-to-output ratio is high. Second, note that N/( ¯ K − N)
is roughly unity. This corresponds well with the data if the equity to debt ratio of publicly owned
ﬁrms corresponds well to the net worth to bank loans ratio of small, wholly owned proprietorships,
such as gasoline stations and restaurants. As discussed above, the latter are the empirical counter-
parts of the entrepreneurs in our model. Third, ther e l a t i v es i z eo ft h eb a n k i n gs e c t o ri nt h em o d e l ,
which is quite small, conforms roughly with the size of the actual banking sector in the 1920s.
Fourth, although we have not obtained data on the fraction of GDP used up in bankruptcy costs,
we suspect that the relatively low number of 0.84 percent is not be far from the mark. Finally, note
that while inﬂation in the model is low by postwar standards, it is somewhat higher than what it
was in the 1920s.
29Table 4 reports the consolidated asset and liability accounts for the banks in the model. Several
things are worth noting here. First, in the model most demand deposits are created in the process of
extending working-capital loans. These deposits are what we call “ﬁrm demand deposits,” and they
are roughly 7 times as large as the quantity of demand deposits created when households deposit
their ﬁnancial assets with banks (i.e., “household demand deposits”). We are not aware of data that
would allow us to evaluate this implication of the model. Second, the results in the table indicate
that the amount of bank reserves in the model matches reasonably well with the corresponding
quantity in the data. For example, in the model excess reserves are 2.2 percent of the sum of bank
reserves and working-capital loans. We estimate that the analogous number for the U.S. economy
in the 1920s is only slightly larger, around 3.4 percent.
Table 5 reports various monetary and interest rate statistics. The left set of columns shows that
the basic orders of magnitude are on track: Base velocity and M1 velocity in the model match
up reasonably well with the data. The ratio of currency to demand depositsi sa l s or e a s o n a b l e .
However, the fraction of currency in the monetary base is high, as noted above. The interest rate
implications of the model accord reasonably well with the data. However, the interbank loan rate
is a little high.
Taken together, these results suggest to us that the steady state implications of the model cor-
respond reasonably well with the data.
4.2 Parameters of Exogenous Stochastic Processes
We estimate the stochastic parameters of the model using quarterly observations covering the pe-
riod 1923I-1939IV on the data in (21). We adopt a standard state-observer s e t u pi ns u p p o s i n gt h a t
t h em e a s u r e dd a t ac o r r e s p o n d st oXt plus an error that is independently distributed over time and
across variables. We follow convention in referring to this error as “measurement error,” although
we actually think of it as some combination of literal measurement error and model-speciﬁcation
error. We then estimate the unknown parameters using a standard maximum-likelihood procedure.
This part of our estimation procedure focuses only on ﬂuctuations. We abstract from means at
both the parameter estimation and model diagnostic stages. At the estimation stage we do so by
subtracting the sample means from the data and setting the model mean to zero. When we simulate
the model to determine how well it matches the data, we impose the condition that the mean in the
model coincides with the mean in the data.
304.2.1 Methodology
For convenience, we describe our system using the notation in Hamilton (1994, chapter 13). Let






































or, in obvious, compact notation:










The observation equation is
yt = Hξt + wt, (24)
where wt is a vector of measurement errors and
H =
£
τ ¯ τ ˆ τ
s ¤
.
Note from (20) that Hξt = Xt, apart from the constant vector, α. We interpret the 13 variables on
w h i c hw eh a v eo b s e r v a t i o n sa syt in (24).
To complete the description of the state space system, we must also specify the variance co-
variance matrix of vt and of the measurement error, wt. We suppose that both these objects are iid
and diagonal. In addition, we suppose that wt is orthogonal to yt and ξt at all leads and lags.35 The




























Our system is completely characterized by (F,H,R,Vϕ). For our purposes here, the free parame-
ters are the diagonal elements of Vϕ and R, as well as the parameters of the time-series represen-
tations of the exogenous shocks, which are contained in ρ and D. There are four parameters per
35These assumptions make it hard to interpret the shock, wt, literally as measurement error. For data such as
aggregate output it seems likely that statistical agencies apply some optimal smoothing before release, and this has the
consequence that measurement error in the published data are correlated with true values.
31shock: an autoregressive and variance term for the time-series representation of the shock, as well
as two parameters governing the monetary policy response to each shock (we model the shocks
and monetary responses as ﬁrst-order autoregressions). In addition, for each of the 13 variables
in yt there is one measurement error variance. Since there are 8 shocks, there is a total of 37 free
parameters for the estimation. Denote these by the vector, Υ. Given the values assigned to the
other parameters of the model, (F,H,R,Vϕ) can be constructed once values are assigned to Υ. We
choose these values to maximize the Gaussian density function, as discuss e di nH a m i l t o n( 1 9 9 4 ,
section 13.4). In this analysis we ignore the levels of variables by removing the sample mean from
the data and replacing the constant term in (20) by a vector of zeros (this was done implicitly in
the deﬁnition of yt in (24).
4.2.2 Results
Tables 6 and 7 report our estimation results. Table 6 displays the estimates of the time-series
representations of the exogenous shocks and the associated monetary policy responses. Table 7
presents the estimated standard-deviation of the measurement errors, wt. We now discuss these in
turn.
Exogenous Shocks and Monetary Policy Response
There are three things worth noting in Table 6. First, in several cases, the autoregressive root of
as h o c kw a sd r i v e nv e r yn e a r l yt ou n i t y( n u m b e r sin the table are rounded). This is how the model
captures the substantial, trend-like persistence in the data. Second, to understand the magnitude
of the innovation standard-deviations, it is useful to express them in terms of their impact on the
level of the shock itself.36 Thus, Table 6 displays the steady state value of each shock, as well
as its position after a positive one-standard-deviation innovation. For example, the steady state
value of the ﬁrm markup, λf, is 1.20, and its value after a one-standard-deviation innovation is
1.21. In almost all cases, the displacement is relatively small. An exception is the shock to γt,
where a positive one-standard-deviation positive innovation drives it a little above its upper limit
of unity. (The fact that it exceeds its upper bound reﬂects a breakdown in the accuracy of (16) as an
approximation to (15).) Overall, we were frankly somewhat surprised that these innovations seem
to be of reasonable magnitude, despite the enormous variation in the data of the 1930s. Third,
the response of monetary policy to the various shocks is relatively weak. The strongest response
appears to be to the technology shock. And, as we show below, this response is not very strong
either.
36Suppose the shock of interest is yt. In the case of shocks with hats, a one-standard-deviation innovation represents
a perturbation to ˆ yt =( yt − y)/y, which translates into a σ × y shock to yt. So, for a variable with a hat, Table 6
displays (y,y + σy). For a variable with a d, a one-standard-deviation innovation represents a y(1 − y)σ shock to yt.
So, for a variable with a d, Table 6 displays (y,y(1 − y)σ).
32Because there is a large literature focused on the estimation and analysis of aggregate tech-
nology shocks, it is of interest to discuss the parameters pertaining to the technology shock,  t, in
greater detail. For comparability with other studies, it is useful to consider the impact of  t on GNP
in a steady state, holding ﬁxed the utilization of capital and labor resources, and holding ﬁxed the
amount of resources absorbed by bankruptcy. After scaling by zt, GNP is:
Y
z
t =  tF(ut,¯ kt,ν
k




where dt is the resources used up in bankruptcy (see the Appendix for an explicit representation
of dt). Here, the function F is the production function of the typical intermediate-goods producer,
(2), after scaling. The fact that aggregate output is a function of aggregate quantities alone reﬂects
that in a steady state, the nature of our price and wage updating rules leads to symmetric behavior
across all households and intermediate-goods ﬁrms. Totally differentiating the above expression
with respect to Y z
t and  t and holding all other variables ﬁxed at their steady state values, we obtain
Y z ˆ Y z
t =ˆ  tF,w h e r eˆ Y z
t ≡ dY z
t /Y z and ˆ  t = d t (recall,   =1 ). We obtain a simple expression
for F/Y z by noting, ﬁrst, that Y z = F − φ − d. Second, our assumption that intermediate-goods
proﬁts are zero in steady state implies that ﬁrm revenues equal ﬁrm costs, so that F − φ = F/λf,
where λf is the reciprocal of real marginal cost (i.e., it is the markup). Combining the previous





Y zˆ  t =
λf (Y z + d)
Y z ˆ  t ≈ λfˆ  t,
since d/Y z is small (see Table 3). So, a one percent change in  t results, approximately, in a 1.2
percent change in gross national product (recall, from Table 2, λf =1 .2). A c c o r d i n gt oT a b l e
6, an innovation in  t has a standard-deviation of 0.0031, w h i c ht r a n s l a t e si n t oa ni n n o v a t i o ni n
GNP of 0.0037. This is about one-half of Prescott’s (1986) estimate of 0.00763 for the standard-
deviation of the innovation to the aggregate technology shock. That Prescott’s estimate should be
larger than ours is perhaps not surprising, since he attributes the entire Solow residual to exogenous
technology, whereas our Solow residual includes sources of endogenous variation, in part because
we include variable capital utilization in our model. Our estimate of the autocorrelation of the
technology resembles Prescott’s in that both are high.
Turning to the monetary response to shocks, note from Table 6 that this is quite small in most
cases. We brieﬂy discuss the policy response to an innovation in technology, because that has
been the subject of a literature. Table 6 indicates that a one-standard-deviation innovation in  t
produces an immediate increase of 0.13 percent in the monetary base. Thereafter, the monetary
base continues to rise until eventually it is roughly 0.96 percent higher than it would have been in
the absence of a shock. That monetary policy accommodates aggregate technology is consistent
with the ﬁndings for the postwar period in Altig et al. (2003) and Gali, Lopez-Sadilo and Valles
33(2003). However, our estimated response is very weak. In particular, the dynamic response of ag-
gregate variables such as output, consumption, employment, capital utilization, and investment are
roughly the same, whether monetary policy responds or not. Either way, all these variables respond
positively, in a hump-shaped pattern to a shock. In the absence of monetary accommodation, the
response is slightly weaker, and in the period of the shock the responses of capital utilization and
employment are actually slightly negative.
Measurement Error
To understand the estimates in Table 7, it is usef u lt oa l s oc o n s i d e rt h er e s u l t si nF i g u r e4 .
The thirteen panels in that ﬁgure display the raw data, yt,t=1 ,...,T,where t =1corresponds
to 1924QI and t = T corresponds to 1939QIV. The relatively smooth line in the ﬁgures displays
the projection of Xt, for each t, o nt h ee n t i r ed a t as e t ,Ω = y1,...,yT. To compute this projection,
E (ξt|Ω), we used the two-sided Kalman smoothing algorithm (see, e.g., Hamilton 1994.) We then
formed E(Xt| Ω)=H × E(ξt|Ω). Prior to graphing the model’s simulated data, we adjusted the
data so that the sample mean in the simulated data coincides with the sample mean of the actual
data. This is consistent with our overall strategy for estimating the stochastic part of the model,
which ignores the difference between the mean in the data and in the model.
In addition to the projection interpretation, there is another interpretation of E(Xt| Ω) that is
more convenient for our purposes. To see this, note ﬁr s tt h a to n ec a no b t a i na ne s t i m a t eo ft h e
economic shocks, E(ϕt|Ω), by projecting both sides of (22) onto Ω :
E(vt|Ω)=E(ξt|Ω) − F × E(ξt−1|Ω)
a n dm a k i n gu s eo f( 2 3 ) . 37 The smooth data in Figure 4 can also be interpreted as the dynamic
response of our model economy to the time-series of estimated shocks, E(ϕt|Ω),t=1 ,...,T.This
is the interpretation that we adopt in the remainder of this paper.
The vertical distance between the line depicting the raw data and the model simulation repre-
sents an estimate of the measurement error, wt, in the state-observer system in section 4.2.1. The
size of the measurement error varies substantially across variables. For example, in three cases
- log(Nt+1/(PtYt)), log(lt), and Rb
t − wt is so small that the two lines in the graph essentially
coincide. According to Table 7, the maximum-likelihood estimate of the standard-deviation of
the measurement error in these variables is 0.017, 0.00014, and 0.0000034, respectively. (The ac-
tual standard errors of the vertical distances in Figure 4 are displayed in parentheses in Table 7,
and these correspond roughly to the maximum-likelihood estimates.) At the other extreme lie the
variables from the national income and product accounts: the growth rate of GNP, the investment-
to-output ratio and the consumption-to-output ratio. Measurement error is estimated to account for
37Note from (23) that there is considerable structure on vt. The Kalman ﬁlter algorithm produces E(vt|Ω) that
respects this structure. Thus, although there are many ways to recover E(ϕt|Ω) from E(vt|Ω), they all produce the
same result.
3473, 15, and 46 percent of the variance in these variables, respectively. To the extent that we inter-
pret these errors as model-speciﬁcation error, they may at ﬁrst seem large enough to be a source of
concern about the quality of model ﬁt. We discuss model ﬁt in the next subsection.
4.3 General Observations about Model Fit
To assess model ﬁt, we converted the variables that appear as ratios and growth rates in Figure
4 into levels. The results are shown in Figure 5, where the variables in Figure 4 that were not
transformed are reproduced for convenience. Note how the basic simulation results resemble the
actual data remarkably closely. The failures of the model captured by the large measurement errors
in Table 7 appear to be concentrated in the high-frequency components of the data.
There are some weaknesses in the model. For example, consumption does not fall enough.
In addition, the fall in output and investment are also not quite large enough. Interestingly, the
model’s real wage exhibits excessive growth during the contraction phase of the Great Depression.
Although the degree of wage rigidity in the model is by some measures quite modest, this evidence
suggests the model might perform better with somewhat less rigidity.
5 The U.S. Great Depression from the Perspective of the Model
This section studies the estimated economic shocks and considers their role in the dynamics of the
Great Depression. The time-series of the eight shocks are displayed in Figure 6. In discussing
t h e s es h o c k s ,i ti su s e f u lt oo r g a n i z et hem into three groups: real shocks, ﬁnancial shocks, and
monetary shocks.
The real shocks include the technology shock and the variables that control ﬁrm and household
market power, λf,t and ζt. Of these, only ζt plays an important role. Its persistent rise helps the
model account for the weakness in employment during the recovery phase of the Great Depression.
Our analysis is consistent with the conclusion of Prescott (1999)a n dC o l ea n dO hanian (1999,
2003) that the failure of hours worked to rise in the late 1930s reﬂected changes in the institutions
of labor markets which had the effect of increasingt h em a r k e tp o w e ro fw o r k e r s .A tt h es a m et i m e ,
ζt seems to have had little to do the with contraction phase of the Great Depression. This is true
also for our two ﬁn a n c i a lm a r k e ts h o c k s ,σt and γt.
Finally, we consider three monetary shocks: bank demand for reserves, ξt, household money
demand, θt, and the household liquidity preference shock, υt. The last shock stands out above all
ourothershocksintermsofitsroleinaccountingforthecontractionphaseoftheGreatDepression.
We provide a detailed analysis of the transmission of this shock.
A crude summary of our model’s account of the Great Depression is as follows. Much of
the contraction phase is due to a rise in the liquidity preference shock, υt. A notable feature of
the expansion phase is the absence of a substantial recovery in employment. According to the
35model, this is due to a persistent increase in the labor market power of households. We ﬁnd both
of these implications reasonable, and they build conﬁdence that this is a useful model for analysis
of counterfactual monetary policy.
5.1 Real Shocks
Our analysis indicates that the role of ﬂuctuations in technology in the Great Depression is very
small. The technology shock,  t, drops only about 1 percent from 1929 to 1933. The third row
of graphs in Figure 7 displays the dynamic behavior of output, employment, the price level, and
investment when the only shock is our estimated technology shock. The ﬁgures show that the
technology shock contributes almost nothing to variation about trend in output, the price level, and
investment.38
Consider ﬁrm market power next. Our estimated λf,t is high before 1929 and then drops
roughly four percent to a lower level, where it is also more volatile (see Figure 6). In results
not shown here, we found that our estimated λf,t’s play only a minor role in the dynamics of the
Great Depression. Although a drop in this variable helps somewhat towards explaining the drop in
the price level, the implied increase in competition has the counterfactual implication that output
and employment are strong. We presume this is the reason our econometric procedure chose to
assign a small role to λf,t.
According to Figure 6, our estimate of households’ labor market power, ζt, increased sharply
by 50-60 percent in the period 1929 to 1933. After this, the estimated ζt stabilizes. It is a challenge
to ﬁnd an economically interesting interpretation of the rise in ζt from 1929 to 1933. Recall that
we have described two interpretations of ζt. Under one, ζt is a measure of the market power of
workers. But to interpret the low level of employment in the early 1930s, for the given real wage,
as reﬂecting increased market power of workers seems implausible. For example, Goldin (2000,
Figure 9) shows that union membership remained stable from the mid-1920s until well into the
1930s. As noted above, ζt can alternatively be interpreted as reﬂecting an increased aversion in
utility for work. At best, this interpretation needs greater elaboration than is provided in our model.
Although the rise in ζt during the period 1929 to 1933 is hard to interpret, the fact that it is high
in the late 1930s is easy to interpret. This is the time when the New Deal legislation was passed to
give greater bargaining power to workers (Kennedy 1999.)
Itiseasytoverifythatthe60percentriseinζt andthe4percentdropinλf,t canroughlyaccount
for the persistent 20 percent drop in employment in a model like ours. For example, consider the
versionofourmodelwithnoﬁxedcosts, money, variablecapitalutilization, investment-adjustment
costs, working-capital, agency costs, growth, or banking system. The resource constraint and
38The analysis of TFP in a previous section suggests that if TFP had been included in the data used for estimation,
the role assigned to technology might have been greater.
36utility function for this model are:





u(c,l)=l o g ( c − bc−1) − ζl
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The second relationship uses β =1 .03−.25,λ f =1 .2,α=1 /3, and δ =0 .10/4. Evidently, a
one percent change in λf has a four times larger impact on employment than a one percent change
in ζ. Still, the magnitude of the change in ζ is so much greater that it dominates. In particular,
the above expression suggests that the 60 percent rise in ζ alone drives down employment by 30
percent, while the 4 percent fall in λf stimulates employment by about 8 percent. The net effect,
22 percent, corresponds well with the observation that employment in 1939 was about 20 percent
lower than it was in 1929.
Figure 7 displays the behavior of our model in response to the ζt shock. The ﬁrst row of ﬁgures
displays the dynamic simulation of output, employment, investment, and the price level in response
to our estimated time-series of ζt. (The dotted line reports the model’s simulation in response to
all shocks, for convenient comparison.) Note that ζt is the only shock that can account for the fact
that employment is substantially lower in 1939 than in 1929 (see the solid line). According to the
ﬁgures, the ζt shock is not particularly useful for explaining the contraction phase of the Great
Depression. For example, it fails to explain the fall in the price level. Somewhat surprisingly, it
also fails to account for the fall in investment. Analysis of the model’s impulse response function
(not displayed) reveals that investment rises in response to a positive shock to ζt. The rise lasts for
a number of periods, after which it eventually falls as a steady state analysis suggests. We found
that this initial increase in investment is partly a function of the high estimated autocorrelation of
ζt. When we replace the estimated autocorrelation of nearly unity with 0.90, then investment falls
immediately in response to a positive shock to ζt. We suspect that the explanation for the transient
rise in investment has to do with our entrepreneurial sector. However, this is something that is still
under investigation. For our present purposes, the message is that the ζt shock is not an important
shock for understanding the contraction phase of the Great Depression.
5.2 Financial Market Shocks
We have two ﬁnancial market shocks. The ﬁrst, γt, measures variations in the rate of destruction
of ﬁnancial wealth. The second, σt, measures the riskiness of entrepreneurs. Figure 7 displays the
dynamic response of output, employment, investment, and the price level to these two shocks.
37Consider the shock, γt. In results not displayed, we found that this shock helps the model ac-
count well for the ﬂuctuations in the value of the stock market. It also has a noticeable effect on
t h er i s kp r e m i u ma n d ,a c c o r d i n gt or o w2o fF i g u r e7 , on investment. Still, according to the results
in Figure 7 this shock plays essentially no role in explaining the ﬂuctuations in output and employ-
ment. We suspect that the small role accorded to this shock by the estimation strategy reﬂects that
ad r o pi nγt has a tendency to generate counterfactually strong consumption. This is a consequence
of the fact that in our model, when an entrepreneur dies, his net worth is transferred to households,
who proceed to consume a large part of it. Indeed, we suspect that this shock is responsible for
the counterfactual jump in consumption evident in Figure 5. A possible improvement to the model
that would allow γt to play a greater role is if some fraction of the entrepreneur’s physical stock of
capital is destroyed when the entrepreneur dies.
Turning to σt, we found that this shock has a substantial impact on the risk premium and on
investment. According to the fourth row of Figure 7, this shock also has a quantitatively noticeable
impact on output and employment. However, the model-simulated movements in these variables
are not well correlated with the corresponding U.S. data. Finally, a difﬁculty that the σt shock
shareswithγt isthatbyreducingtheﬂowofresourcesintoinvestment, itstimulatesconsumption.39
Presumably, this is why it did not have a larger role assigned to it.
5.3 Monetary Shocks
Consider the shock to bank reserve demand, ξt. A c c o r d i n gt oF i g u r e6 ,t h i sv a r i a b l ed i s p l a y sa
trend fall beginning in 1930. In results not displayed here, we found that the primary effect of this
fall is to enable the model to explain the trend rise in the reserves-to-deposit ratio (see Figure 5).
According to the model, this is not a key shock underlying the Great Depression. The same is true
for θt.
Consider now the liquidity preference shock, υt. Figure 6 shows that this shock rises rapidly
beginning in 1929. After 1933 its growth rate falls, though the shock continues to rise for the rest
of the decade. Figure 8 displays the result of simulating our model in response to the estimated
time-series of υt shocks alone. For comparison, the dotted lines display the actual data, reproduced
from the solid line in Figure 5.
The key thing to notice in Figure 8 is that the υt shock accounts for several key features of the
Great Depression. Notice in particular, that it explains part of the loss of value of the stock market,
the fall in the price level, the fall in employment, and part of the fall in output and investment. It
captures part of the rise in the premium and a major part of the fall in M1. Since this shock appears
to be particularly important in our model’s account of the Great Depression, we now explore the
economics of how a rise in υt initially affects ﬁnancial markets, and then how it is transmitted to
39This mechanism has also been emphasized in Romer (1990).
38the rest of the economy.
To understand the chain of events that an innovation in υt initiates, it is useful to understand
how the household reacts to a tightening in its liquidity constraint, (9). Let µt denote the multiplier
on (9). Recall that the household starts the period in possession of the economy’s stock of base
money, Mb
t, and allocates this between currency, Mt, and deposits, At.S o , µt represents the
marginal value to the household of additional beginning-of-time-t base money. Let λt denote
the multiplier on the household’s asset accumulation equation, (11). This multiplier represents
the marginal value of end-of-time-t base money. The ﬁrst-order condition associated with Mb
t+1
in the Lagrangian representation of the household’s problem implies λt = βµt+1. (We ignore
uncertainty in this discussion.) That is, the shadow value of end-of-period base money is equal to
the discounted shadow of base money at the beginning of the next period.
Using these multipliers, we can write out the ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the house-
hold’s currency and deposit decisions:
uM,t + βµt+1 = µt (25)
uDh,t +( 1+Rat)βµt+1 = µt. (26)
Here, uM,t anduDh,t denotethetime-tmarginalutilityofcurrencyandhouseholddeposits, respectively.
In (25) and (26), the left side measures the beneﬁt of the given liquid asset, and the right side, the
cost. In the case of currency, the beneﬁt of an additional unit of currency is the marginal utility of
that currency. There is also a pecuniary beneﬁt, βµt+1, because at the end of the time-t, currency
held during time-t adds to the household’s beginning of time-t +1holdings of base money. The
r i g h ts i d eo f( 2 5 )h a sµt, the shadow value of a unit of current-period base. This captures the fact
that a marginal unit of currency requires giving up a unit of monetary base. Expression (26) is the
analogous condition, applied to the household’s deposit decision. The principal substantive differ-
ence between the two expressions is that the pecuniary beneﬁt associated with deposits is greater,
since they pay interest.
Since the marginal cost of an extra unit of deposits is the same as the marginal cost of an extra
unit of currency, the marginal beneﬁt so ft h et w oa s s e t sm u s tb et h es a m e .S i n c ed e p o s i t sh a v ea
greater pecuniary payoff, their non-pecuniary payoff is necessarily smaller:
uDh,t <u M,t.
Now, suppose something happens to raise the shadow value, µt, of current-period base, while
leaving Rat and µt+1 unaffected. Then, the total marginal beneﬁt of both assets must rise. Since
the non-pecuniary part of the return to deposits is relatively small, it must be that uDh,t rises by a































It follows that when the shadow value of current-period monetary base rises, then households
allocate more base to currency.
With these considerations in mind, we can proceed to discuss the effects of a jump in υt.
According to our estimates (see Table 6), the monetary authority kept the monetary base roughly
unchanged in response to a liquidity preference shock. At the same time, a jump in υt drives up the
marginal utility of deposits and currency (see (27)-(28)). With the desire for liquidity up, and the
total supply unchanged, the shadow value of liquidity, µt, rises. By the argument in the previous
paragraph, this induces households to reduce Dh
t /Mt. Since monetary policy keeps the sum of
these two variables ﬁxed, this requires reducing Dh
t and raising Mt. Figure 9 displays the response
of these variables, expressed as a ratio to their unshocked steady state growth paths, in response to
a one-standard-deviation positive innovation in υt (for the magnitude of this shock, see Table 6 and
the associated discussion.) Note how currency rises to a peak of about 1 percent above the steady
state, while deposits fall by about 2 percent. In the quest for additional liquidity, households cut
back on consumption and on the acquisition of time deposits. Figure 9 shows how these variables
drop relative to their unshocked steady state growth paths. Time deposits eventually drop by 2
percent, and consumption eventually drops a little over 1 percent.
The reduced supplyof reservesto banks leads toa drop in M1. These effects showupininterest
rates. Figure 9 shows the interbank loan rate rises, at least initially.
Entrepreneurs feel the effects of these developments. The interest rate paid by non-bankrupt
entrepreneurs rises, and this, together with the lost income due to the fall in capital rent in the
slowing economy, drives up the bankruptcy rate (these are not shown). The latter rises to over
one percent per quarter above the steady state value of 0.8 percent. Entrepreneurs cut back on
purchases of new capital, and this leads capital producers to reduce investment. This leads to a
fall in the price of capital, which exacerbates the fall in net worth. This fall further constrains the
ability of entrepreneurs to purchase capital, leading to an additional fall in investment. In effect,
the credit market restrictions have the effect of amplifying the negative output effects associated
40with the initial reductions in spending. Output ultimately falls over 1.5 percent in response to the
one-standard-deviation jump in the liquidity preference shock. Investment falls over 4 percent.
Qualitatively, at least, all these effects resemble what actually happened to the economy after
1929. One exception is the interest rate, which rises initially. However, this effect is transient, and
rates fall very soon after their initial rise. We suspect that this reﬂects the fall in money demand as
the amount of economic activity declines.
6 Counterfactual Analysis
We identify a monetary policy rule which, if implemented starting in 1929IV, would have resulted
in a mild recession in the 1930s rather than the Great Depression. The rule feeds back on the
monetary shocks only.40 The policy calls for a temporary increase in money growth in the periods
after the shock. We pursue this type of policy in ord e rt ob ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ew a s
essentially no scope for short-term interest rates to fall after 1932. We illustrate the importance of
“backloading” the money response in this way by comparing it to a policy in which the full money
base response is concentrated in the period of the shock (“frontloading”). This policy would have
made the zero-bound restriction on the interest rate bind.












where x is the steady state net growth rate in the monetary base. Also, xi,t is the component of












i 6=0 , indicating that the monetary policy response
does not begin until the period after the shock. In addition, we set θ
2
i > 0, so that part of the policy
response occurs more than one period after the shock. We considered only those i’s corresponding
to the monetary shocks, ξt,θ t, and υt. The policy we computed is one of “leaning against the
wind.” That is, if, in the absence of a monetary response, an innovation would lead to a fall in
output, then our counterfactual policy calls for an increase in the base. Otherwise, the policy calls
for a decrease.
40In some models an appropriately designed feedback rule can exactly neutralize the impact of money demand
shocks on the economy. In our model, this is not the case, even though we consider monetary base rules that react to
individual shocks. This can be seen by studying the equations that characterize equilibrium in our model (these are
listed in the appendix). A given money demand shock and the money base growth rate appear asymmetrically across
more than one equation. As a result, it is not possible to set the monetary base to exactly extinguish a shock.
41In the case of shocks, ξt, to the bank demand for excess reserves, θ
1
i = −7 and θ
2
i =0 .85.
With this parameterization, the monetary base falls 0.55 percent in the period after a one-standard-
deviation innovation in ξt. Because θ
1
i > 0, the monetary base continues to fall in later periods
and it eventually stabilizes at a level 3.7 percent below where it would have been in the absence
of a shock.41 This is a policy of “leaning against the wind” because a rise in ξt signiﬁe saf a l li n
bank demand for excess reserves, which would lead to an expansion in output in the absence of a
monetary response. The policy response is substantially greater than what we estimated actually
occurred (see Table 6).
I nt h ec a s eo fθt,θ
1
i = −1, and θ
2
i =0 .85. Thus, the drop in the monetary base in the period
after a one-standard-deviation innovation in θt is 0.08 percent. Eventually, the base falls by 0.55
percent. In the absence of any monetary policy response, an innovation in θt has the effect of
stimulating output in our model.42 The response of the counterfactual policy to θt is somewhat
weaker than what we estimated to have occurred. Finally, in the case of υt,θ
1
i =2 , and θ
2
i =0 .6.
As a result, the monetary base rises by 0.29 percent in the period after a one-standard-deviation
innovation in υt. Eventually, the monetary base rises by 0.72 percent in response to such a shock.
T h ed o t t e dl i n ei nF i g u r e1 0d i s p l a y st h ed y n a m ic behavior of the variables in our model, in
response to all the estimated shocks and the counterfactual policy rule for the period 1929-1939.
The solid line indicates the behavior of thesame variables underthe estimated monetary policy rule
and shocks. We refer to this as the “baseline simulation.” With one caveat, it corresponds to the
dotted line in Figure 5. The caveat reﬂects our estimation strategy, which focusses on model means
at the calibration stage, but abstracts from these at the stage where we estimate the parameters of
the stochastic processes.43 One difference between the dottedl i n ei nF i g u r e5a n dt h eb a s e l i n e
simulation in Figure 10 (solid line) that deserves emphasis is that the short-term interest rate (the
“policy rate”) is nearly 4 percentage points higher in Figure 10 than in Figure 5. Because of this,
the interest rate in our model has a longer way to fall before hitting zero than the interest rate in
the U.S. economy in the 1930s did. To make sure that we do not give ourselves any ﬂexibility
that policymakers in the 1930s did not have, we only considered counterfactual policies in which
the interest rate never falls below the lowest value taken on by the interest rate in the baseline
simulation.
41The contemporaneous response to an innovation of σ in a shock is computed as σ × x × θ
1
i × 100, where σ is
found in Table 6. The eventual response is σ × x × θ
1
i × 100/(1 − θ
2
i).
42To see why, note from (8) that since the currency-to-household-deposit ratio exceeds unity, one of the effects of
an increase in θt is to raise the marginal utility of consumption. See Table 5 for the currency-to-household deposit
ratio. (Note that the currency-to-deposit ratio is well below unity.) Given our parameterization, this is the dominant
effect of an increase in θt, and this is why a positive innovation in this shock stimulates output.
43Recall that the estimation strategy chooses parameter values of the stochastic processes in order to make the
actual and model data in Figure 4 as close as possible. We abstract from the model’s mean implications by adjusting
the model data by a constant to ensure that model and empirical sample averages coincide. The variables in Figure 5
are just the variables in Figure 4, transformed. The baseline simulation reported in Figure 10 corresponds to the dotted
line in Figure 5, except that no constant adjustments were made.
42Note ﬁrst the dynamic behavior of real output. The magnitude of the contraction in the period
1929-1933 is cut substantially under the counterfactual policy (see Table 8). In the baseline sim-
ulation output falls by 26 percent (i.e., 4 times the 6.4 percent annual rate), while it falls only 6
percent under the counterfactual policy rule. Over the whole decade, output rises 8 percent under
the counterfactual rule, versus the 10 percent fall recorded in the baseline. Output growth over
the entire decade of the 1930s is 0.8 percent per year, a little over one-half its trend value of 1.5
percent. Initially, the interest rate falls relative to the baseline, but in the later part of the 1930s, it
is higher than the baseline.
Turning to the other variables in the counterfactual simulation, consider ﬁrst the monetary base.
The rise in this variable over the full decade is 12 percent per year. The rise in the price level is
roughly3.2percentperyear. Thecounterfactual policyhas averysubstantial effectonassetvalues,
d r i v i n gu pt h er e a lv a l u eo fn e tw o r t hb ya sm u c ha s4 0p e r c e n tm o r ea f t e r1 9 3 2 .T h ei m p a c to n
asset values before this is smaller, and perhaps this is the reason that the counterfactual policy
does not have a large impact on investment until later. The counterfactual policy introduces some
negatively correlated volatility in consumption and investment, which appears to cancel in output.
We do not, as yet, understand the reason for this volatility.
Itisinterestingthatthecounterfactualpolicyhassuchasubstantialstimulativeimpactonoutput
without driving the interest rate down unduly. The reason for this is that the monetary policy
response to shocks occurs primarily in the periods after the shock. As a result, the policy injects
a substantial anticipated inﬂation effect into the interest rate. To illustrate this, we considered a
monetary policy in which θ
0










i are both set to zero.
With this policy the response of money to a shock is completely frontloaded. This reduces by a
substantial amount the magnitude of the anticipated inﬂation effect on the interest rate. In addition,
because the monetary response is completely unanticipated when it occurs, it has a relatively large
impact on real allocations. To make the policy comparable to our counterfactual, we scaled the
money responses to a shock by 0.69 so that the growth rate of output is 0.8 percent per year
over the 1930s, as in the counterfactual policy in Table 8.44 Not surprisingly, with this alternative
counterfactual, the rise in thep r i c el e v e li sm u c hl e s s ,o n l y0.8 percent per year in the 1930s, versus
3.2 percent per year in the counterfactual (see Table 8 for the latter). In addition, M1 rises by less
as well. The other variables in Table 8 are roughly unchanged. However, the interest rate response,
displayed in Figure 11, is quite different. Under the alternative counterfactual, the interest rate
drops substantially below the baseline simulation results. Such a large reduction in the interest
rate could not have been implemented in the 1930s because it would have violated the zero lower
bound constraint.
It is worth emphasizing that if the policy reaction function were stronger than it is in the coun-
terfactual, then the output response would have been stronger as well. However, this would have









43come at the cost of substantially higher inﬂation. For example, when we set θ
1
i to 7, rather than its
value of 2 in the counterfactual, we found that average output growth in the 1930s is close to trend,
1.6 percent. However, this comes at the cost of substantially higher inﬂation. The annual inﬂation
over the period 1929-1939 is 7.3 percent, and over the period 1933-1939 it is 12.5 percent.
It is worth noting that the effectiveness of monetary policy in reducing the severity of the
Great Depression depends very much on the state-contingent nature of the policy. To establish
this, we considered a second alternative counterfactual experiment in which we instead adopted
a completely deterministic monetary policy in 1929IV. In this policy, the money growth rate is
roughly equal to the realized money growth in our counterfactual experiment. The impact on real
v a r i a b l e so ft h i sp o l i c yw a sm i n o r .T h i sr e ﬂects that in the long run, monetary policy is roughly
neutral in our model. Unexpected monetary policy, whether driven by exogenous random shocks
or disturbances to the economy’s fundamentals, do have a substantial effect. To document this,
w es i m u l a t e dav e r s i o no fo u rm o d e li nw h i c ht h e only shock driving the monetary base is an iid
monetary policy shock. We picked the sequence of shocks to force the monetary base to grow as in
our counterfactual experiment. We found that the impact on output and employment of this policy
was roughly comparable to what we obtained in the counterfactual experiment.
We conclude this section by brieﬂyi n d i c a t i n gi nw h a ts e n s ew ec o n ﬁrm the hypothesis of
Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Note that in our conterfactual experiment there is considerable
g r o w t hi nM 1 . I nf a c t ,w ef o u n dt h a tw h e nm o n e t a r yp o l i c yi sd e s i g n e dt os i m p l yp r e v e n tt h e
decline in M1, this is not enough to substantially modify the course of the Great Depression in our
model. In this sense we do not conﬁrm Friedman and Schwartz, who argue that the 1930s would
have been substantially improved if only the Fed had not permitted the drop in M1. We do conﬁrm
Friedman and Schwartz, however, in the sense that we identify a monetary policy that would have
substantially reduced the severity of the Great Depression.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have constructed a model of the U.S. economy in the 1920s and 1930s. The model deserves
to be taken seriously as a laboratory for monetary policy because it reproduces key features of
the data. According to the model, a liquidity preference shock played an important role in the
contraction phase of the Great Depression. Increased market power of workers accounts for the
persistently low level of employment and high real wages during the expansion phase of the Great
Depression. The model indicates that a monetary policy which reacts to the innovations in the
liquidity preference shock and other monetary shocks would have substantially reduced the mag-
nitude of the Great Depression.T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h eF r iedman-Schwartz hypothesis.
The analysis of this paper suggests several avenues for future research. First, it would be of
interest to see whether the liquidity preference shock plays an important role in other times and
44places, such as the postwar U.S., Japanese or Euro-area economies. In addition, it would be of
interest to explore, at a more foundational level, the nature and sources of our liquidity preference
shock. Second, our model incorporates various features: a banking sector, ﬁnancing frictions,
etc. Isolating the contribution of each of these features to the transmission of shocks is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, doing so would provide crucial information for future model
development. Third, in our analysis we have identiﬁed a particular feedback rule that relates the
monetary base to the exogenous shocks, which would have mitigated the severity of the Great
Depression. Discussions about monetary policy often focus on rules that relate variables such as
the interest rate or the monetary base to endogenous variables such as inﬂation and the output
gap. We conjecture that there are monetary policy rules like this that would, in practice, work
like the one that we study, and it would be of interest to explore this further. Fourth, we have
based our analysis on a linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions of the model. Given the
relatively large size of the shocks during the Great Depression, it would be of interest to explore the
robustness of the results to higher order approximations. Fifth, it would be of interest to explore
optimal monetary policy in our model. Presumably, this requires a solution method which can
accommodate an occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint on the interest rate. We suspect
that such rules would involve accommodating money demand shocks, as our counterfactual rule
does.
45A Appendix: Model Solution
This appendix reports the details of how we solved our model. The solution strategy involves
linearization about the model’s nonstochastic steady state. After a brief overview, we discuss the
computation of the steady state. We then present the linearized equations of the model. The model
solution was described in section 3.9. It involves a set of core endogenous variables, ˜ zt. The
variables in this 23 by 1 vector are:
˜ zt =
⎛
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Here, and throughout this paper, a hat (^) over a variable indicates percent deviation from its
nonstochatic steady state. That is, if x is the steady state value of xt, then ˆ xt =( xt−x)/x. Most of
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To solve for the 23 variables in ˜ zt, we linearize 23 equations of our model. We express these in
matrix form as follows:
Et [α0˜ zt+1 + α1˜ zt + α2˜ zt−1 + β0Ψt+1 + β1Ψt]=0 . (30)
We seek a solution of the form, (19), which ensures that (30) is satisﬁed for all possible ˜ zt−1 and
Ψt, and which is covariance stationary. This requires an A and B that satisfy:
α0A
2 + α1A + α2I =0
α0(AB + Bρ)+α1B + β0ρ + β1 =0 .
We found that there is a unique A with eigenvalues inside the unit circle that satisﬁes the ﬁrst
equation. Conditional on this value of A, the second set of equations is linear in B.
To complete our discussion of the solution method requires explaining how α0,α 1,α 2,β 0, and
β1 w e r ec o m p u t e d .T h i sr e q u i r e sad i s c u s s i o no ft he steady state of the model and of the actual
equations in (30).
A.1 Model Steady State
This section describes our strategy for computing the steady state for our model. In many models,
solving for the steady state is straightforward, because one can ﬁnd a recursive ordering among
the equations. We were not able to do so for our model, and so the computation of the steady
state represents a considerable challenge. We developed two strategies. In the ﬁrst one we set
some of the endogenous variables of the model to values that seem reasonable based on empirical
evidence, making these variables exogenous in the steady state calculations. We moved an equal
number of the model’s exogenous variables into the list of variables that were endogenous in
the steady state calculations. This approach allowed us to reduce the problem of computing the
steady state to the relatively manageable one of solving a single equation in a single unknown.
This approach works well for solving our baseline model. However, it is impractical when we
considered a counterfactual experiment in which it was desired to change the value of one (and
only one) exogenous variable.45 A second strategy was developed for this. We now describe the
two strategies. Our description refers to the steady state formulas which are derived subsequently.
45In the main text, we discuss the results of this experiment, where we change the value of the money growth rate,
µ.
47For the ﬁrst strategy, the set of exogenously set variables are:
τ
l,β ,F (¯ ω),µ ,x ,µ z,λ f,λ w,α ,ψ k,ψ l,δ ,υ ,
τ





The variables to be solved for are:
q, π, R
e,R a,h er,R ,R







b,ξ ,h Kb,y ,g ,σ .
The equations available for solving for these unknowns are summarized below. The ﬁrst three
variables are trivial functions of the structural parameters, and from here on we treat them as
known. In addition, Ra can be solved using equation (51) below. There remain 22 unknowns.
Below, we have 22 equations that can be used to solve for them.
The algorithm involves ﬁnding a value of R that solves (40). To evaluate (40) requires ﬁrst
solving for the other ‘endogenous’ variables. For a given R, we proceed as follows. Solve for her
using (46). Solve for Rk using (36); solve for ¯ ω using (37); solve for σ using the given values of
F(¯ ω) and ¯ ω, as well as the condition, Eω =1 ;solve for k and n using (38) and (39); solve for i
using (35); solve for w using (31); solve for l using (33); solve for c using (55); solve (56) and (54)
for g and y; solve for uz
c using (52); solve for mb and λz using (49) and (50); solve (53) for ψL;
solve for er
z using (48); solve ξ from (47); solve ev from (43); solve xb from (42); hKb from (41).
Vary R until (40) is satisﬁed. In these calculations, all variables must be positive, and:
0 ≤ m ≤ 1+x, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1,λ z > 0,k>n>0.
Our second strategy solves the steady state when the ‘exogenous variables’ are the economi-
cally exogenous ones, and the ‘endogenous variables’ are the economically endogenous ones. In
particular, consider the situation in which the exogenous variables are:
τ
l,β ,µ ,x ,µ z,λ f,λ w,α ,ψ k,ψ l,δ ,υ ,x
b,ξ ,σ ,
τ
k,γ ,τ ,σ L,ζ ,σ q,θ ,υ ,w
e,ν
l,η g,ψ L.










z,e v,h Kb,y ,g ,ν
k,m .
We solve for the 26 variables above as follows. The ﬁrst three are solved in the same way as before.
The remainder are solved by solving three equations, (40), (42), and (46), in the three unknowns,
rk,ν k, and R. Ideally, we start in a neighborhood of the solution obtained in the previous calcu-
lations. Fix a set of values for rk,ν k, and R. The basic sequence of calculations is the same as
48above. Solve for Rk using (36), and then ¯ ω, F(¯ ω) using (37) and the value of σ. Then, solve for k,
n, and i using (38), (39), and (35), in that order. Next, we obtain w from (31) and l from (33). The
resource constraint, (55), can be used to obtain c; and (56) and (54) can be used to compute y, g.
Then, obtain λz and uz
c from (52) and (53). Solve (49), (50) and (51) for Ra,m ,and mb. This can
be made into a one-dimensional search in m. In particular, for a given m, solve for Ra from (51)
and for mb from (49). Vary m until (50) is satisﬁed. In this search, the lower bound on m is zero,
while the upper bound is θ(1+x), and is dictated by Ra ≥ 0. Compute her,h Kb,e ν, and er
z, using
(41), (43), (47), and (48). We can now evaluate (40), (42), and (46). Vary rk,ν k, and R until these
equations are satisﬁed.
The equations that rk,ν k and R solve are not well behaved. They are not well deﬁned for all
possible values of rk,ν k and R. Typically, this happens because there is no m that satisﬁes (50).
We found that if the equations are deﬁned for a particular set of values of rk,ν k, and R, then they
are not deﬁned for what seems like a tiny perturbation. Equations of this type are hard to solve with
standard Gauss-Newton algorithm, unless one has an extremely good idea of the exact solution. To
ﬁnd such a solution, we applied a random search m e t h o d .W em a d eag u e s so ft h et r u es o l u t i o n ,
and then constructed an interval about that solution. We drew randomly from that interval, and
recorded the parameter constellation which produced the outcome closest to zero for the equations
of interest. After the algorithm ran for 5 minutes or so, it had found a solution close enough that
a Gauss-Newton method could take over and productively drive into the exact solution for rk,ν k,
and R.
We now describe the equations of the steady state.
A.1.1 Firms
From the equations that characterize the ﬁrm sector and the assumption that there are no price





















In addition to (29), real marginal cost is also equated to the ratio of the real marginal cost of renting












Combining (29) with (32) in steady state:









The ﬁrst-order necessary condition for maximization of It for the capital producers is
Et [λtPtqtF1,t − λtPt + βλt+1Pt+1qt+1F2,t+1]=0 .
Here, F1t and F2t denote the derivatives of the adjustment cost function with respect to its ﬁrst
and second arguments. Multiplying the ﬁrst-order condition by zt/Pt we obtain, in steady state:
λzqF1 − λz +
β
µz
λzqF2π =0 . (34)
Since F1 =1 , and F2 =0 ,
q =1 .
Also,































k +( 1− δ)
¤
π + τ
kδ − 1. (36)
Conditional on a value for Rk,R e, the steady state value for ¯ ω may be found using the following
equation:




1 − µ¯ ωh(¯ ω)
∙
1+Rk
1+Re (Γ(¯ ω) − µG(¯ ω)) − 1
¸
=0 , (37)





This equation has two additional parameters, the two parameters of the lognormal distribution, F.
These two parameters, however, are pinned down by the assumption Eω =1and the fact that we
50specify F(¯ ω) exogenously. With these conditions, (37) forms a basis for computing ¯ ω. Note here
that when µ =0 , (37) reduces to Rk = Re. Then, combining (36) with the ﬁrst-order condition
for time deposits, we end up with the conclusion that rk is determined as it is in the neoclassical
growth model.
From the single ﬁrst-order condition for k in the costly-state-veriﬁcation problem, and condi-






1+Re (Γ(¯ ω) − µG(¯ ω))
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Rk − Re − µG(¯ ω)
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The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the bank’s supply of deposits to households, At,a n d
working-capital loans, Sw












[τher,t +1 ]=0 , (45)
where λ
b
t is the multiplier on the technology associated with the provision of bank deposits. Hence,
another efﬁciency condition for the banks can be obtained by taking the ratio of (45) to (44).












46See BGG for details.
51Substituting out for abxb (ev)













z =( 1− τ)m































































The ﬁrst-order condition for consumption corresponds to:
u
z











1 − m + x
¶1−θ#1−σq
. (50)
Taking the ratio of (49) and the ﬁrst-order conditions for mb, and rearranging, we obtain:
Ra =
(1−m+x)











































A.1.7 Resource Constraint and Zero Proﬁts
After substituting out for the ﬁxed cost in the resource constraint using the restriction that ﬁrm
proﬁt sa r ez e r oi ns t e a d ys t a t ea n du s i n g























The object in square brackets is gross national product, y, so that (55) corresponds to c+i+g = y.
















Write the ﬁrst two expressions after the equality as F − φ. T h e s ea r et h er e v e n u e s ,i nu n i t so f
goods, paid to the typical intermediate-goods producer. The total cost of producing these goods is
sF, where s denotes marginal cost. In steady state, s =1 /λf. Zero proﬁts requires that revenues













We obtain the expression for gross national product in the square brackets in (55) by substituting
out for φ in (56) from (57).
A.2 Linearizing the Model Economy
This section describes the 23 equations that characterize the equilibrium for our model economy.
In each case, we present the log-linear expansion of the equation about the nonstochastic steady
state. With a few exceptions, we also present the non-linear representation of the equation.
A.2.1 Firms
The log-linearized expression for inﬂation in our model is taken directly from Christiano, Eichen-










(1 − βξp)(1 − ξp)
(1 + β)ξp
³
ˆ st + ˆ λf,t
´¸
=0 . (58)























b ¯ kt +ˆ ut
i´
− ˆ st =0 (60)
A.2.2 Capital Producers
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003), we suppose that F(It,I t−1) has the follow-
ing form:
F(It,I t−1)=[ 1− S(It/It−1)]It,
where S00 denotes the second derivative of S, evaluated at the steady state value of It/It−1. In
addition, we suppose that S = S0 =0in steady state. Recalling that the the ﬁrst-order necessary
condition for maximization of It for the capital producers can be written:
Et
∙






we linearize this expression as,
Et
£
ˆ qt − S
00µ
2
z(1 + πβ)ˆ ıt + S
00µ
2







There areﬁve equations pertainingto entrepreneurs. Theﬁrst is the optimality condition associated





After linearization, this reduces to:
Eˆ r
k
t − σaˆ ut =0 , (62)
where σa = a00/a0 and a00, a0 denote the second and ﬁrst derivatives of a, respectively, evaluated in
steady state.
Of the other four equations corresponding to the entrepreneurial sector, two characterize the
loan contracts received from banks. The third deﬁnes the law of motion of entrepreneurial net

























t+1 is the rate of return received by households, which is constrained not to be a function





Γt(¯ ωt+1)=¯ ωt+1 [1 − Ft(¯ ωt+1)] + Gt(¯ ωt+1),
where Ft denotes the cumulative distribution function for ωt+1. Here, a prime indicates derivative
with respect to ¯ ωt+1. We assume that Ft corresponds to a lognormal distribution with a mean
of zero and a standard-deviation, σt. The second equation that characterizes the optimal contract
corresponds to the condition that bank proﬁts are zero in each state of nature:






(Γt(¯ ωt+1) − µGt(¯ ωt+1)) −
Q ¯ K0,t ¯ Kt+1
Nt+1
+1=0 .


















For a detailed discussion of the two equations that characterize the optimal contract, see Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
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ˆ σt} =0 .
Here, Γωω and Gωω denote the second derivatives of Γ and G with respect to ¯ ω, evaluated in
steady state. Also, Γσ and Gσ denote the derivatives with respect to σ in steady state, and Γωσ and
Gωσ represent the corresponding cross derivatives. Finally, λ denotes the steady state value of the
multiplier on the bank zero-proﬁt condition in the Lagrangian representation of the problem solved








































ˆ qt−1 + b ¯ kt − ˆ nt
´
=0 .





























Here, γt is the probability that an entrepreneur survives from time-t to time-t +1 . Also, we
t =
We
t /(ztPt) and We
t is a transfer made to each entrepreneur in existence in time-t+1. This includes
the γt who were alive in time-t and survive into time-t+1, as well as the 1−γt new entrepreneurs
born in time-t. The linearized law of motion for scaled net worth is:
−ˆ nt+1 + a0 ˆ R
k




b ¯ kt +ˆ qt−1
´
+ a4 (ˆ γt − ˆ πt) (65)
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t+1 +( 1− δ)qˆ qt+1
(1 − τk)rk +( 1− δ)q




Following is a discussion of the four equations corresponding to the banking sector. For a detailed
discussion of these equations, see Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995). It is useful to begin








imposing the deﬁnition of working-capital loans, Sw


















Linearizing this expression about the steady state:
− ˆ ev,t + nmb ˆ m
b
t + nm ˆ mt + nxˆ xt
+(nk − dk)
h




t + nw ˆ wt (67)
+(nl − dl)ˆ lt − dνkˆ ν
k
t − dνlˆ ν
l
t =0 .
H e r e ,w eh a v eu s e dt h ec o n d i t i o nkt = ¯ ktut. Also,
nmb =( 1 − τ)m
b (1 − m + x)/¯ n
nm = −(1 − τ)m
bm/¯ n
nx =( 1 − τ)m
bx/¯ n
nw = nl = −τψlwl/¯ n
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of excess reserves. It is useful to develop expressions for the partial derivative of the function on
the left of the equality, which we denote by h, with respect to real excess reserves and labor. The
derivative of h with respect to real excess reserves is:
her,t =( 1− ξt)x
b (ev,t)
−ξt ,
which, in linearized form, is:




+l o g( ev)
¸
ξˆ ξt − ξˆ ev,t.
The derivative of h with respect to labor is:










Deﬁning hz,lb,t = hlb,t/zt and linearizing hz,lb,t :










1 − νk − ˆ kt
¸
.
The ﬁrst-order conditions in the Lagrangian representation of the bank problem associated with
At and Sw








thlb,t =0 . (68)
Substituting for λ
b




− (1 + ψlRt)wt.
Linearizing this, and taking into account the expressions for ˆ her,t and ˆ hz,lb,t, we obtain:
0=lR ˆ Rt + lξˆ ξt − ˆ wt + leˆ ev,t (69)
+lνlˆ ν
l
t + lνkˆ ν
k
t + llˆ lt + lkˆ kt,
where







,l ψl = −
ψlR
1+ψlR
lµ = kµ − 1,l νl = kνl +
νl
1 − νl,l l = kl − 1,
lνk = kνk −
νk




















kνl = −(1 − α)
νl
1 − νl,k νk =( 1− α)
νk
1 − νk,k l =( 1− α),k k = −(1 − α).
Recalling that the ratio of (45) to (44) is:
Rat =
(1 − τ)her,t − 1
τher,t +1
Rt,
we can linearize this expression. Takinginto account the expressions for ˆ her,t and ˆ hz,lb,t, we obtain:
ˆ Rat − her
∙
1 − τ









+l o g( ev)
¶
ξˆ ξt − ξˆ ev,t
¸
(70)
− ˆ Rt =0

















t (1 − mt + xt)










Linearizing this, we obtain:




































t + ˆ kt
´
].
It is of interest to note that monetary policy cannot exactly neutralize the ˆ ξt shock. From (66),
we see that the impact of ˆ xt on ˆ ev,t is determined by nx. So, according to (67), neutralizing the ˆ ξt
59shock requires setting the component in ˆ xt pertaining to ˆ ξt, ˆ xˆ ξt,t as follows:






+l o g( ev)
¶
ˆ ξt.
The same reasoning applied to (71) implies:




Evidently, the previous two equations cannot both be satisﬁed at the same time.
A.2.5 Households
We now turn to the equations associated with the household sector. It is useful to deﬁne uc,t as the
derivative of the present discounted value of utility with respect to Ct :
Et {uc,t − u
0(Ct − bCt−1)+bβu
0(Ct+1 − bCt)} =0 .
Using the deﬁnition, uz

























c2 (µz − b)
2cˆ ct+1 −
bµz
c2 (µz − b)
2cˆ ct−1} =0 .























where λz,t = λtztPt. Linearizing this expression:
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−(1 − σq)(log(m) − log(1 − m + x)) +
1+x
θ(1 + x) − m
¸
θˆ θt




ˆ λz,t + ˆ Ra,t
´
} =0 .
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Mb
t+1 is:















t+1 − Mt+1 + Xt+1
+ βλt+1 [1 + Ra,t+1] − λt}
=0 .
Scaling this by multiplying by Ptzt:











































+( 1− σq)ˆ ct+1 − (1 − σq)log(m)θˆ θt+1 − θ(1 − σq)ˆ mt+1
−[(1 − θ)(1− σq)+1 ]
µ
1
1 − m + x
¶
[xˆ xt+1 − mˆ mt+1] (74)
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θˆ θt]
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ˆ xt−1 − ˆ πt − ˆ m
b
t =0 . (77)





where the xit’s are functions of the underlying shocks, as discussed in section 3.7.
A.2.7 Aggregate Restrictions
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Here we have ignored additional terms in the aggregate resource constraint which appear when
labor and capital are misallocated across the intermediate goods ﬁrms. For a justiﬁcation, see the
63argument in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003), which builds on the important work of
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y + φ + d
.
The capital accumulation equation is:
¯ Kt+1 =( 1− δ) ¯ Kt + F(It,I t−1).
Scaling, by dividing both sides by zt :







Linearizing and taking into account the restrictions on F discussed above,









ˆ ıt =0 . (80)
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71Table 1: Behavior of Investment-to-GNP Ratio in Recessions











Notes: Source for postwar business cycle data: Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ website. I -N o m i n a l
household purchases of durable goods, plus gross
private domestic investment; Y - Nominal gross
domestic productTable 2: Model Parameters (Time unit of model: quarterly)
P a n e lA :H o u s e h o l dS e c t o r
β Discount rate 1.03−0.25
ψL Weight on disutility of labor 145.32
σL Curvature on disutility of labor 1.00
υ Weight on utility of money 2e-008
σq Curvature on utility of money -10.00
θ P o w e ro nc u r r e n c yi nu t i l i t yo fm o n e y 0.75
b Habit persistence parameter 0.63
ξw Fraction of households that cannot reoptimize wage within a quarter 0.70
λw Steady state markup, suppliers of labor 1.05
Panel B: Goods-Producing Sector
µz Growth rate of technology (APR) 1.50
S00 Curvature on investment adjustment cost 7.69
σa Curvature on capital utilization cost function 0.01
ξp Fraction of intermediate good ﬁrms that cannot reoptimize price within a quarter 0.50
ψk Fraction of capital rental costs that must be ﬁnanced 0.70
ψl Fraction of wage bill that must be ﬁnanced 1.00
δ Depreciation rate on capital. 0.02
α Power on capital in production function 0.36
λf Steady state markup, intermediate good ﬁrms 1.20
Φ Fixed cost, intermediate goods 0.036
Panel C: Entrepreneurs
γ Percent of entrepreneurs who survive from one quarter to the next 97.00
µ Fraction of realized proﬁts lost in bankruptcy 0.120
F(¯ ω) Percent of businesses that go into bankruptcy in a quarter 0.80
Va r(log(ω)) Variance of (Normally distributed) log of idiosyncratic productivity parameter 0.07
P a n e lD :B a n k i n gS e c t o r
ξ One minus power on excess reserves in deposit services technology 0.9690
xb Constant in front of deposit services technology 82.1902
Panel E: Policy
τ Bank reserve requirement 0.100
τk Tax rate on capital income 0.29
τl Tax rate on labor income 0.04
x Growth rate of monetary base (APR) 1.610Table 3: Steady State Properties of the Model, versus U.S. Data
Variable Model U.S. 1921-29 U.S. 1964-2001
k
y 8.35 10.81 9.79
i
y 0.20 0.24 0.25
c
y 0.73 0.67 0.57
g
y 0.07 0.07 0.19
rk 0.043
N




Percent of goods output lost to bankruptcy 0.371%
Percent of aggregate labor and capital in banking 1.00% 1%3 2.5%5
Inﬂation (APR) 0.11% -0.6%4 4.27%6
Note: 1End of 1929 stock of capital, divided by 1929 GNP, obtained from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002)..
2Masulis (1983) reports that the debt-to-equity ratio for U.S. corporations averaged 0.5 - 0.75 in the period 1937-
1984. 3Share of value-added in the banking sector, according to Kuznets (1941), 1919-1938. 4 Average annual
inﬂation, measured using the GNP deﬂator, over the period 1922-1929. 5B a s e do na n a l y s i so fd a t ao nt h eﬁnance,
insurance, and real estate sectors. 6 Average annual inﬂa t i o nm e a s u r e du s i n gG N Pd e ﬂator.Table 4: Consolidated Banking Sector Balance Sheet, Model versus U.S. Data
Variable Model 1921-1929 1995-2001 Variable Model 1921-1929 1995-2001
Assets (fraction of annual GNP) 1.296 0.722 0.604 Liabilities (fraction of annual GNP) 1.296 0.604
Total reserves 0.122 0.152 0.081 Total demand deposits 1.000 1.0 1.0
◦ Required reserves 0.100 0.118 0.052 ◦ Firm demand deposits 0.878 0.523
◦ Excess reserves 0.022 0.034 0.029 ◦ Household demand deposits 0.122 0.477
Working-capital loans 0.878 0.848 0.919
◦ Capital rental expenses 0.249
◦ Wage bill expenses 0.629
Entrepreneurial loans 0.803 0.525 0.828 Time deposits 0.803 0.525 0.828
Notes on Table 4: Total assets consists of reserves, plus working-capital loans, plus loans to entrepreneurs. The ﬁrst
line shows the ratio of these to annual goods output. With the exception of the bottom row of numbers, remaining
entries in the table are expressed as a fraction of bank reserves plus working capital loans. The bottom row of numbers
is expressed as a fraction of total assets.
Data for the period 1995-2001: We deﬁne working-capital loans as total demand deposits minus total reserves.
T h i sn u m b e ri st h es a m eo r d e ro fm a g n i t u d ea st h es u mo fs hort-term bank loans with maturity 24 months or less
(taken from the Board of Governors’ “Banking and Monetary Statistics”, 1943) and commerical paper (Table L101
in Board of Governors’ Flow of Funds Accounts). Long-term entrepreneurial loans are deﬁned as the total liabilities
of the nonﬁnancial business sector (nonfarm nonﬁnancial corporate business, plus nonfarm noncorporate business,
plus farm business) net of municipal securities, trade payables, taxes payables, “miscellaneous liabilites,” and the
working-capital loans. Source: With exception of required and excess reserves, the source is the Federal Reserve’s
Flow of Funds data. Required and excess reserves are obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Data for the period 1921-1929: We deﬁne working-capital loans as total demand deposits minus total reserves
for all banks. Entrepreneurial loans are constructed on the basis of all bank loans minus working capital loans plus
outstanding bonds issued by all industries. Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics, Board of Governors, September
1943, and NBER historical database, available at www.nber.org.Table 5: Money and Interest Rates, Model versus U.S. Data
Money Model 1921-1929 1964-2002 Interest Rates (APR) Model 1921-1929 1964-2002
Monetary base velocity 9.77 12 16.6 Demand deposits 1.07 3.21
M1 velocity 3.92 3.5 6.5 Time deposits 4.66 6.96
Rate of return on capital 6.91 17.33
Currency / Demand deposits 0.28 0.2 0.3 Entrepeneurial standard debt contract 5.31 5.74 8.95
Currency / Monetary base 0.70 0.55 0.73 Interest rate on working capital loans 4.76 4.72 7.10
Curr. / Household D. Deposit 2.30 Interbank loan rate 5.87 3.90 6.86
N o t e st oT a b l e5 :
Data for 1921-1929: (1) “Federal funds rate” is the average rate on bankers’ acceptances. (2) Interest rate on
working-capital loans is the commerical paper rate. (3) Rate on loans to entrepreneurs is the average of returns on
Aaa and Baa corporate bonds. (4) Rate on time deposits is available only from 1933 onwards. Reported data in
Board of Governors (1943) only cite the administrative rate (maximum rate) set by the Fed. The average of this
rate was 2.7% over the period 1933-41. (5) There are no data available on the rate paid on demand deposits (to our
knowledge).
Data for 1964-2002: (1) The federal funds rate covers the period 1964III-2002III. Source: Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve. (2) The rate on demand deposits is the “Money Zero Maturity Own Rate” (1964III-2002III).
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. (3) The rate on loans to entrepreneurs is the average between Aaa
and Baa corporate bonds (1964III-2002III). Source: Board of Governors. (4) The rate on time deposit is the rate on
3-month CDs (1964III-2002III). Source: Board of Governors. (5) The rate of return on capital is the rate of proﬁto n
stockholders’ equity for the manufacturing sector (1980I-2001IV). Source: Bureau of the Census (2002, Table I). (6)
The rate on working-capital loans is the rate on commercial paper (dealer-placed unsecured short-term negotiable
promissory notes issued by companies with Aa bond ratings and sold to investors), averaged over 1971I-2002III.
Source: Board of Governors. (7) The Currency to M1 ratio is an average over 1964III-2002III (currency includes
dollars held abroad). Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. (8) The Currency to Monetary Base ratio is the
average over 1964III-2002III (currency includes dollars held abroad). Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis.
(9) The Monetary Base and M1 velocities are averages over 1964III-2002III (currency includes dollars held abroad).
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis.Table 6: Parameters of Exogenous Shocks and Monetary Policy Response
Shock, λt : λt = ρλt−1 + ϕt,E(ϕt)
2 = σ2




steady state plus % contemporaneous % long-run
Shock ρ σ one-σ innovation)(i) θ
2 θ
0 impact on base(ii) impact on base(iii)
Firm markup, ˆ λf,t 0.932 0.0090 (1.20,1.21) 0.499 12.813 0.046 0.09
Bank demand for reserves, dξt 0.999 0.1962 (0.969,0.975) 0.956 -0.380 -0.030 -0.68
Money demand, dθt 1.000 0.2067 (0.750,0.789) 0.941 -4.648 -0.38 -6.51
Household market power, ˆ ζt 1.000 0.0602 (1.00,1.06) 0.792 -10.120 -0.24 -1.17
Liquidity demand, ˆ υt 0.981 0.3586 (2.00,2.72) × 10−8 0.265 -0.078 -0.011 -0.015
Rate of survival of entrepreneurs, dγt 0.588 1.2354 (0.970,1.006) 0.529 -0.840 -0.42 -0.88
Shock to technology of goods-producing sector, ˆ  t 0.935 0.0031 (1.000,1.003) 0.868 101.896 0.13 0.96
Shock to riskiness of entrepreneurs, ˆ σt 1.000 0.0890 (0.27,0.29) 0.235 5.994 0.21 0.28
Notes - (i) (y,z), y ~steady state value of shock, z = y + y × σ for variables with hat, z = y + y × (1 − y) × σ for variables with a d.
(ii) 100 × x × θ
0 × σ. (iii) 100 × x × θ
0 × σ/(1 − θ





















Yt) 1.4 × 10−1
(1.4×10−1)
0.149
log(πt) 1.3 × 10−2
(1.3×10−2)
0.473 log(V 1
t ) 4.1 × 10−2
(4.4×10−2)
0.106
log(lt) 1.4 × 10−4
(3.4×10−6)
0.000 log(Ct




t 3.4 × 10−6
(9.5×10−9)
0.000 Pe
t 5.9 × 10−4
(4.6×10−4)
0.035
∆log(Yt) 3.1 × 10−2
(3.2×10−2)
0.730 log(dc















t) 2.4 × 10−2
(1.8×10−2)
0.002
Notes: (i) σw not in parentheses - point estimate of standard deviation of measurement error
from maximum likelihood estimation; (ii) σw in parentheses - standard deviation of vertical
distance between actual and ﬁtted data in Figure 4; (iii) ratio of σ2
w from (ii) to σ2
X, the sample
variance of raw data on variable in the ﬁrst column.Table 8: Annualized Percent Growth Rates, Data Versus Alternative Models
1929-1933 1933-1939 1929-1939
(1)(i) (2) (3) (4)(ii) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)(ii)
Output -9.2 -6.4 -3.8 -1.6 5.1 2.6 1.9 2.4 -0.6 -1.0 -0.4 0.8
Investment -35.3 -28.5 -17.3 -15.7 16.9 13.2 4.1 13.8 -4.0 -3.5 -4.5 2.0
Hours worked -7.3 -7.3 -5.0 -2.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 0.2 -2.1 -2.1 -1.1 -0.7
Price level -7.6 -9.2 -7.8 -6.5 1.7 2.1 -1.6 9.7 -2.0 -2.4 -4.1 3.2
M1 -9.1 -8.5 -7.3 -1.7 8.1 6.2 1.4 12.8 1.2 0.3 -2.1 7.0
Real wage 0.4 2.8 1.3 2.6 4.0 2.2 1.4 2.1 2.6 2.4 1.4 2.3
TFP -2.3 -1.1 -0.4 -0.8 3.2 1.8 1.2 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6
Firm wedge -9.0 -7.3 -0.5 -8.3 -2.0 -6.1 -5.6 0.5 -11.1 -13.3 -6.1 -7.8
Household wedge(iii) 54.9 43.8 30.7 23.7(iv) 1.3 7.0 -8.1 42.3 56.2 50.8 22.6 65.9(iv)
Note: Statistics denote 100×log(xj/xi), where xj and xi denote average values of x in the indicated years
(except where noted); except in the last two rows, numbers are converted to annualized, percent terms.
(i) (1) is U.S. data; (2) is estimated model with all shocks; (3) is estimated model with only υt shock;
(4) is results for counterfactual policy. (ii) results for 1929 correspond to 1929IV.

























































K: Spread, Baa and Aaa Bonds






L: Economy-wide Real WageFIGURE 2: One Period in the Life of an Entrepreneur 
 
* End of period  t: Using net worth, 
Nt+1, and loans, entrepreneur 
purchases new, end-of-period stock 
of capital from capital goods 
producers. Entrepreneur observes 
idiosyncratic disturbance to its 
newly purchased capital.  
After realization of period  
t+1 shocks, entrepreneur 





capital to capital 
producers 
Entrepreneur pays 
off debt to bank, 
determines current 
net  worth. 
If entrepreneur 
survives another 
period, goes back to *.
Period t+1  Period t  





Period  t+2 
shocks 
realized 
Figure 3: Maturity Structure of Time and 
Demand Deposits 
Time deposits created at end of current period goods market 
and liquidated at end of next period goods market. 
Demand deposits 
created before current 
goods market, and 
liquidated after current 
goods market 
t  t+2 -0.5
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Log, Reserves-to-Deposit Ratio               
Figure 4: Actual and Fitted Data, Growth Rates and Ratios
Notes:
(i) Dotted line - Model fitted values, produced by
              two-sided Kalman smoothing.
(ii) Solid line  - Actual data.
(iii) In several cases, actual and fitted coincide.
































































Log, Bank Reserve-to-Deposit Ratio








(i) Dotted, solid line - Model, actual data.
(ii) Results obtained by first adding 
   actual data sample mean to results displayed
   in Figure 4 and then aggregating to levels.
(iii) Currency-deposit, reserves-deposit ratio,
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Figure 7: Output, Employment, Investment and Price Response to Indicated Single Shock, and all Shocks
Notes: 
(i) Dotted line: response of model to all estimated shocks. 
 (ii) Solid line: response of model to one of the estimated shocks.
 (iii) All simulations assume economy is in nonstochastic steady state in 1923I.
(iv) Row 1: Labor market power, ζ 
t, Row 2: Financial wealth shock, γ
t, Row 3: Technology shock, ε 






























































Log, Bank Reserve-to-Deposit Ratio
Figure 8: Model Response with Only υ









 Results correspond to those in Figure 5, 



























































































Figure 9: Response to One-Standard Deviation Innovation to Liquidity Preference, υ
t
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